




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INTRODUCTION.

IN taking so grave a step as to animadvert strongly on the published opinions of men of eminence and character, I think it my duty to show, by a few citations of their own words, where the original is English, and in the case of Dr. Strauss, by a few translated extracts, that I do not deal in merely vague accusations, and that I have not overstated the gravity of the case.

And by way of commencement, in order to show the change in the tone of the public, or the speculative mind during the last forty years, and to supply a measure of the distance over or down which we have travelled within that period, I will quote a passage from a competent and well-informed writer. In the 'Christian Advocate's' publication for 1829, Mr. Hugh James Rose, who then held the office at Cambridge, when giving his reason for a partial deviation from the usual course in the choice of his subject, observes as follows:—

"As far as I have been able to collect, no persons have stood forward, very recently, as the *avowed* opponents of Christianity, whose characters or whose works give them any claim to consideration or reply."*

Dr. Whewell's Bridgwater Treatise on Astronomy and Physics was published in 1834; and the whole of that series, given to the world about the same date, seemed to be a public proclamation of the established harmony between Science and Religion.

* Advertisement to Rose's 'Christianity Always Progressive' (London 1829).

Neither of the Universities had, as far as I know, been disturbed for a great length of time by any controversy affecting the foundations of belief. Dean Milman's 'History of the Jews,' which appeared about 1830, was attacked with severity, perhaps almost ferocity, by Dr. Faussett, then the Margaret Professor of Divinity at Oxford. The same work was republished, with a preface fully maintaining its propositions, in 1863. Those, who read it now, will find some assistance towards estimating the change in our position, from observing the slightness of the cause which then sufficed to produce an excitement not inconsiderable.

I must add that for twenty years, or thereabouts, from that time, according to my observation, belief was everywhere, to all appearance, progressively extended and confirmed. Perhaps the first note of the coming assault was the publication of the work entitled 'Vestiges of Creation.' It obtained a wide circulation; but in general society it was almost universally condemned. I here purposely confine my references to the works of men anonymous or dead. The difference of times became observable, when the fatalistic book of Mr. Buckle, notwithstanding its ungainly form and the portentous width of its plan, became a favourite even in drawing-rooms and in boudoirs. But the spirit of class with us enters into these matters among others; and while unbelief well printed, well bound, and well ushered into the world—in a word, unbelief in broadcloth—seems to be held perfectly "respectable," unbelief in fustian is still almost savagely condemned.

I wish to add that the aim of my Address is not to preach pessimism, but to point to a specific evil for a specific purpose. And that purpose is to warn, I will not say to prepare—for that is a much larger matter—the minds of those who heard it, against that which they cannot fail to meet with, warned or unwarned. I named accordingly one

or two of the seductive (I am almost tempted to call them cant) phrases of the day, and some of the thoroughly unsound intellectual habits which, it is strange to say, are more or less tolerated among those sometimes described as the thinkers of the age, sometimes by other favourite and not less imposing titles. I am aware that many objections may be taken to my having touched the subject. One of those I should feel the most lies against the necessarily crabbed and partial nature of my reference to such parts of it as I have named. Besides, there are other heads which I should have wished to touch, and among them the strange assumption that, because God is infinite, the finite mind of man can have no points of true contact with Him; and the grossly fallacious character (as I believe) of the assumption that not only for individuals but for generations, and in the long-run of human history, Christian morality, or the morality which has hitherto been considered Christian, can be separated from Christian dogma, and can permanently survive its abandonment.

I wish to place on record my conviction that belief cannot now be defended by reticence, any more than by railing, or by any privileges and assumptions. Nor, again, can it be defended exclusively by its "standing army"—by priests and ministers of religion. To them, I do not doubt, will fall the chief share of the burden, and of the honour, and of the victory. But we commit a fatal error if we allow this to become a merely professional question. It is the affair of all.

It is very difficult in handling such controversies to avoid the tone of assumption and denunciation. I desire, therefore, once for all, to abjure all imputations against motives or characters. Equal credit for the love of truth should be allowed by all to all, and the endeavour made, or at least intended, to unite plain speaking with personal respect.

Yet this, though an obvious is not an easy duty ; for it is impossible to view certain states of mind as other than the results of strong, though honest, self-delusion.

This duty of personal respect is especially due at a time, when the writers against Christian belief stand in a moral position so different from that of its principal French assailants during the last century. The combat is not now with the authors of the 'Pucelle' and the 'Confessions;' but with men who, though they believe less than Voltaire and Rousseau, yet either revere or sympathise more ; who for the most part seek to avoid hard language ; who commonly confess not only that Christianity has done good, but even that it may still confer at least some relative benefit before the day of perfect preparedness for its removal shall arrive, and even the most "advanced" of whom, like the author of the 'Martyrdom of Man,' appears to be touched by a lingering sentiment of tenderness, while he blows his trumpet for a final assault at once upon the "Syrian superstition," and on the poor, pale, and semi-animate substitutes for it, which Deism has devised.

ADDRESS.

*[Two passages enclosed within brackets were omitted in the delivery
on account of time.]*

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, AND MY YOUNGER
FRIENDS;

Thirty years have passed away since, in consequence of the accidental disability of a worthier person, I was called upon to deliver the Inaugural Address at the opening of this Institution. In other words, the College has now lived through one generation of men.

At the close of such a term, we may suitably look back, to ascertain how far it has fulfilled or disappointed the expectations of its founders. And first I will refer to the hope they entertained, that they would be able to secure for the government of the Institution the services of a series of learned, able, and earnest men. This expectation, I venture to say, has been amply realised in the persons of Mr. Conybeare, of your old friend now present, Dean Howson, and of Mr. Butler.

Further, it was to be an institution having religion for its centre and its base; and that religion was to be the religion of the Church of England. That the national Church is not in less esteem now than it was then with the nation, the immense increase, alike of her fabrics and her ministrations, may sufficiently show. That those who guide the fortunes of this College do not desire to change the ground they have occupied from the first, can

need no proof on an occasion, when I know from the Principal how much it is desired by them to erect a Chapel within the precincts, in order to the more solemn and effectual celebration of the offices of religion.

But it was also a part of the design, that with religious teaching should be combined the practice of religious liberty; that no compulsory lessons or observances should be imposed, to hinder the enjoyment by the entire youth of Liverpool of the general advantages of the College. How has this portion of the scheme been found to fare? The kindness of your old, respected, and indefatigable Secretary enables me to answer the question. From him I learn that no religious difficulty has impeded the working of the plan; that among the pupils of the College, comprehensive with respect to nationality as well as to communion, there were found a short time back, upon inquiries, Unitarians, Wesleyans, Baptists, Roman Catholics, members of the Greek Church, Presbyterians, and Jews; and that, of the whole number of pupils in the three schools of the College, not less than one-fourth were of religious professions distinct from our own.

Nor have the promoters of the College been disappointed in their hope to furnish the people of Liverpool with easy access to the higher forms of education at their own doors, and to strengthen and enlarge their connection with the old Universities of the land. The seven hundred pupils on its books afford ample proof of the favour of the community; and the number of able men whom it has sent to those Universities indicates the wish of Liverpool to secure for its sons the advantages of what has been commonly termed the higher education.

[There is, however, some difference among us as to the question, what really is the higher education? There are those who think not only that our old methods of

training the young were too exclusive, but that they were fundamentally bad; who would supplant entirely, or expel from the first place in education, the study of man in its various branches, and would substitute for it the study of Nature as it exists otherwise than in man: and again who, in so much as they would admit of the human studies into the course of education, would put aside the ancient for the modern, whether in philosophy, history, or language. The great faults, as I believe, of the ancient educational studies of this country were—first, that they were too narrow; and secondly, that they were too uniform, and did not take heed enough of varieties both of condition and of mind. The consequence was, in the very best men, frequent ignorance of what every cultivated person ought to know; and in all who were unequal to the favoured studies, or whose turn lay in another direction, a great waste of time with little fruit, if not even a confirmed habit of idleness. Therefore it is to be admitted that much wrong was done to the natural sciences. But that wrong is not to be redressed by giving them prospectively more than their due. Such notwithstanding appears to be the desire of some of their professors; and it has been indicated by a practice of claiming for them, in a pre-eminent or even an exclusive sense, the name of science. So that a man who observes and reasons upon plants or animals, the constituent parts of the globe, or of the celestial system, is a man of science; but to observe and reason upon history, upon philosophy in its older sense, or upon theology, establishes no such title, though the very same process of collecting and digesting facts, and of drawing inferences from them, is pursued in the one case and in the other; and though it seems sufficiently absurd to hold that there is a science of the human body, but that there can be no science of the mind or soul. This can surely be no better than a mere fashion of the

hour, and with the hour it must pass away. It is the incidental excess of a reforming movement, and we may hope that while the excess will disappear the reform will remain. Were it, from a mere caprice, to harden into an accepted doctrine, I see not in what it could end, except in a pure materialism.]

But, gentlemen, while freely admitting that what may be termed utilitarian studies were in my early days too much overlooked, that the knowledge of the material universe was sadly neglected, that to many minds only such food was offered as they were wholly unable to digest, and that the upshot was a lamentable waste of power, I claim for the old method of our public schools and colleges that it had merits and advantages, for the loss of which no parade of universality, no increase of mere information, could possibly compensate. It taught with that rigid accuracy, which is the foundation of all really solid learning. It held thoroughness in a few things to be better than show in many. It enthroned in the seat of honour the most masculine studies. I have now passed forty years of life upon an arena of competition as sharp as is to be found anywhere in the world. I have seen all forms of training, practical as well as other, pretty fairly matched with one another; and all descriptions of men, with every variety of natural gifts, bringing up as it were the results of their various modes of education to be tested. The best mode has to struggle with the defects of nature, and the worst will not wholly neutralise her bounties. Here and there, again, you may find a man whose self-training power can dispense with all appliances from without. But these are rare instances indeed.

"Pauci, . . .
Dis geniti, potuere."*

* Virg. *Æn.* vi. 129.

I speak, however, not of the one but of the million ; and, as among the million, I affirm that there is no training for the conflicts and the toils of life, so far as I have seen, which does greater justice to the receiver of it than the old training of the English public schools and universities. I speak of my own experience and observation, in the sphere in which I have lived ; but probably there are few spheres, though I will not say there are none, in which the whole making of a man is more severely tried. And that my testimony, which is of course limited, may at least be definite, I will add that I speak of such training as it was at Oxford, more, I am sorry to say, than forty years ago.

All this must be a paradox and a stumbling-block to such as think, that the sole or main purpose of education is to stock the mind with knowledge as a shop is stocked with goods, and that the wants of life are to be met like the wants of customers. And doubtless one of the purposes of education is thus to furnish materials for future employment ; but this is its lower, not its higher purpose. The shop takes no benefit, though it may take damage, from the wares which it receives ; but the greatest and best use of the information, which is imported into the mind, is to improve the mind itself. A more instructive comparison may be drawn between education and food. As the main purpose of food is to make the body strong and active, so the main purpose of education is to make the mind solid, elastic, and capable of enduring wear and tear. The studies which are most useful, so far as utility is external to the mind, though they are on that account the most popular, and though they are indispensable,—such, I mean, as reading, writing, arithmetic, modern languages, or geography,—are those which do, not most but least, for our intellectual and moral training. The studies which have it for their main object to act on the composition and capacity of the man,

will, to such as follow them with their whole heart, be found to yield a richer harvest, though the seed may be longer in the ground. Yet I fully admit that the test of a good education is neither abstract nor inflexible. Such an education must take account both of the capacity of the pupil and of the possibilities of his future calling. All I would plead for is, that where there is a choice, the highest shall be preferred. In the words of our most famous living poet—

“ It was our duty to have loved the highest ; ” *

And our duty it must ever remain.

In this institution I trust the prerogatives of “ the highest ” will always be admitted ; and around it there will be marshalled, each in its due order and degree, the numerous and ever multiplying studies, of which every one has an undoubted title to honour in its tendency to embellish or improve the life of man.

But indeed there is much to be said and done about education, besides determining the relative claims, or, as it would now be called, the due co-ordination, of the different kinds of knowledge. Quite apart from these claims, much, my younger friends, and more than you can as yet perhaps fully understand, depends upon the spirit in which those kinds of knowledge are pursued. And this again depends, not upon the incidental advantages of birth or wealth, but upon ourselves. The favours of fortune have both their value and their charm ; but there is in a man himself, if he will but open out and cultivate his manhood, that which will be found amply sufficient to supply their place.

Now, as to this important subject, the spirit in which we pursue education, the degree in which we turn our advantages to account, I must say of us here in England that we do not

* Tennyson's ‘ Guinevere.’

stand well. Our old Universities, and the schools above the rank of primary, have as a class the most magnificent endowments in the world. I am well aware that this institution is far indeed from being open to such a reproach. It may, however, be doubted whether the amount of these endowments, in England alone, is not equal to their amount on the whole continent of Europe taken together. Matters have mended, and are, I hope, mending. We have good and thorough workers, but not enough of them. The results may be good as far as they go ; but they do not go far. But in truth this "beggary return," not of empty but of ill-filled boxes, is but one among many indications of a wide-spread vice ; a scepticism in the public mind, of old as well as young, respecting the value of learning and of culture, and a consequent slackness in seeking their attainment. We seem to be spoiled by the very facility and abundance of the opportunities around us. We do not in this matter stand well, as compared with the men of the middle ages, on whom we are too ready to look down. For then, when scholarships and exhibitions, and fellowships and headships, were few, and even before they were known, and long centuries before triposes and classes had been invented, the beauty and the power of Knowledge filled the hearts of men with love, and they went in quest of her, even from distant lands, with ardent devotion, like pilgrims to a favoured shrine.

Again, we do not stand well as compared with Scotland, where, at least, the advantages of education are well understood, and though its honours and rewards are much fewer, yet self-denying labour, and unsparing energy in pursuit of knowledge, are far more common than with us. And once more, we do not stand well as compared with Germany ; where, with means so much more slender as to be quite out of comparison with ours, the results are so much more abundant, that, in the ulterior prosecution of almost every

branch of inquiry, it is to Germany, and the works of the Germans, that the British student must look for assistance. Yet I doubt if it can be said with truth that the German is superior to the Englishman in natural gifts; or that he has greater or even equal perseverance, provided only the Englishman had his heart in the matter. But Germany has two marked advantages: a far greater number of her educated class are really in earnest about their education; and they have not yet learned, as we, I fear, have learned, to undervalue, or even in a great measure to despise, simplicity of life.

Our honours, and our prizes, and our competitive examinations, what for the most part are they, but palliatives applied to neutralise a degenerate indifference, to the existence of which they have been the most conclusive witness? Far be it from me to decry them, or to seek to do away with them. In my own sphere, I have laboured to extend them. They are, however, the medicines of our infirmity, not the ornaments of our health. They supply from without inducements to seek knowledge, which ought to be its own reward. They do something to expel the corroding pest of idleness, that special temptation to a wealthy country, that deadly enemy in all countries to the body and the soul of man. They get us over the first and most difficult stages in the formation of habits, which, in a proportion of cases at least, we may hope will endure, and become in course of time self-acting.

One other claim I must make on behalf of examinations. It is easy to point out their inherent imperfections. Plenty of critics are ready to do this; for in the case of first employments under the State, they are the only tolerably efficient safeguard against gross abuses, and such abuses are never without friends. But from really searching and strong examinations, such as the best of those in our Universities and schools,

there arises at least one great mental benefit, difficult of attainment by any other means. In early youth, while the mind is still naturally supple and elastic, they teach the practice, and they give the power, of concentrating all its force, all its resources, at a given time, upon a given point. What a pitched battle is to the commander of an army, a strong examination is to an earnest student. All his faculties, all his attainments must be on the alert, and wait the word of command ; method is tested at the same time with strength ; and over the whole movement presence of mind must preside. If, in the course of his after life, he chances to be called to great and concentrated efforts, he will look back with gratitude to those examinations, which more perhaps than any other instrument may have taught him how to make them.

General remissness, gentlemen, is not the besetting sin of our great town communities ; least among them all of Liverpool. Nowhere is the pedestrian's pace more rapid than in her streets ; nowhere is his countenance more charged with purpose. We live, gentlemen, in a wealth-making age. It may surprise you to hear, but I believe it to be unquestionably true, that more wealth has, in this little island of ours, been accumulated since the commencement of the present century—that is, within the lifetime of many who are still among us—than in all the preceding ages from the time, say, of Julius Cæsar ; or any other more remote date you please. And, again, at least as much of this wealth has been stored within the last twenty years, as in the preceding fifty. Liverpool has had even more than her share in this great, this almost portentous activity. Since I knew her, she has scooped four miles of solitary shore into teeming docks ; and I am now told she is about to add other miles to these. Fed by the mere overflow of her wealth and energy, the little hamlets that faced her in Cheshire have grown into great and vigorous town districts, larger, I believe, in population than she her-

self was at the commencement of the century. Her opulence, I think, has grown in still greater proportion than her numbers. If we ask, Where is this to end? when will this marvellous process be arrested? when will this great flood-tide begin to ebb? I, for one, know not; I am by no means sure that we are as yet even near high-water. But with the impetuosity of this galloping career, with the wonderful development of such arts of life as bear directly upon enjoyment, there grows up continually a correlative amount of dangers and temptations.

“The world is too much with us; late and soon,
Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers.”*

So it is. The world, in truth, becomes more worldly. It ties us down to earth by more and stronger cords, and to break them requires bolder and more assiduous effort. If we wish to secure our freedom against the perils that environ it, this is not to be done by renouncing business, or by abating energy in its pursuit; it is by balancing that activity with other activities. Yes, it may be replied, we ought to live in the world unseen, as well as in the world we see. And that is doubtless true; and for many, whose opportunities are small, it is sufficient; but for this great community, whose opportunities are large, though true, it is not the whole truth. The entire nature of man is the garden, which is given him to cultivate. We cannot, as a nation or as individuals, be well if we do not provide for the soul as well as the body. But neither can we be well if we do not, according to our means, provide for the mind as well as the soul. That is the principle enshrined and represented in this institution, as it is in every ancient university and college, and as it must be in every institution which aspires

* Wordsworth's 'Miscellaneous Sonnets,' No. 33.

to superintend anything that deserves the name of the higher education.

And why should not Liverpool, why should not commerce, afford a field favourable to art, literature, and science, as much as to philanthropy and religion? Half a century ago, the name of this town stood high with respect to mental cultivation. There is nothing in the pursuit of the merchant that ought to preclude the pursuit of mental refinement. The day's work is not so long, nor the anxiety so constant, as to wear out the whole stock of energy that a vigorous English nature can command. In Greece, the State which took its place at the head of literature and philosophy and art was noted for its encouragement of trade. "The best products of Sicily and Italy, of Cyprus and Egypt, of Lydia and Pontus, and every other country, flowed," says Xenophon,* "into the markets of Athens, which ruled the sea." "Hither," says Thucydides,† "come all the products of all the earth;" and Pericles and Alcibiades‡ were not ashamed of superintending extensive manufactories which they owned.

In Florence, the true Athens of modern times, many of the nobles were among the most conspicuous merchants.§ And when Holland took the place of Italy at the head of the commerce of Europe, Art and Science walked in the noble train of Liberty, and the University of Leyden, founded in memory of the heroic efforts of the citizens, took its place, even in that little country, among the very foremost of the universities of Christendom.|| We now speak with deserved respect and gratitude of the learned labours of Germany: but those who observe the German names, and the German

* Xenophon, 'De Rep. Ath.' ii. 7.

† Thuc. ii. 38.

‡ Boeckh, 'Public Economy of Athens,' ii. 63 (Trans. London, 1828).
See also St. John, 'Manners and Customs of Ancient Greece,' iii. 276.

§ Hallam's 'Middle Ages' (8th edit.), vol. i. p. 285.

|| Motley's 'United Netherlands,' vol. iv. ch. liii. p. 526, ed. 1869.

firms, which have established themselves in the commercial communities of England, will readily understand that no country is making advances more marked than theirs in the paths of enterprise.

If then, as I am persuaded, there are among you, my younger friends, those who, though destined to the pursuits which have made this great emporium famous, have in tasting of the cup of knowledge acquired the desire for longer and for deeper draughts; if any of you can say with Virgil of his Muses, *

“*Quarum sacra fero ingenti percussus amore,*” *

there is no reason why he should be discouraged; no reason why he should regard the beginning of business as the end of culture; but let him rather resolve that, though it be but in fragments of his time, he will woo his studies with a lifelong love.

And now forgive me if, using the melancholy privilege of age, and addressing a few words especially to you who are still so young, I seem to assume that in youth you may learn more readily from others some lessons, which you would acquire at greater cost and more slowly for yourselves. To each and all I would say, that God has sent no one of you into the world without a work ready for him to do, and facilities wherewith to do it. What this work is, reflection, or parental guidance, or a kind of instinct, may have told you. If it has not yet been discovered, you have only to follow this one rule: Do your best; try to make the most of all your faculties; “*Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do,*” says the wise man,† and in like manner, whatsoever thy mind findeth to do, “*do it with thy might.*” You would with justice think meanly of a boy who did not at cricket, or football, or any other sport, try with all his heart to win, or

* Virg. ‘*Georgics*,’ ii. 476.

† Eccles. ix. 10.

do his part towards winning. Is there not something wrong, I would almost say something base, in our standard of action, of which bone and muscle are thus developed, and most properly developed, to the uttermost, if the mind is allowed to wither and to dwindle for want of manly exercise?

You, who have successfully shown your disposition to excel, I congratulate you on your success. But that success would be a misfortune and a snare to you, if you rested in it; if, to use a homely expression, you went to sleep upon it. It is like the meal which the traveller enjoys upon his way, but the purpose of which is to strengthen him for his further journey. The prize is good, but the efforts which are made to gain the prize are far better. What is most valuable in these competitions, then, the defeated share with the conquerors, nay further yet, one defeated after a hard and bracing struggle gains more in the true work of education, the strengthening of his mind, than some easy winner who canters in without serious exertion. And such defeat, in a mind of true British temper, only strengthens the resolution, which never in the long-run fails, to try yet more manfully next time.

For, do what you will, your life, because it is a human life, will be, and that in many ways, a trial.

“So it is willed above, where will is power.”*

And this world-old truth seems, as the world grows older, to grow more vividly and pointedly true, with the ever-growing strain and noise, and haste and waste, of life; a trial which cannot be escaped by flying from it, but which may be conquered by facing it.

On an occasion like this, I should not have desired, even before those of you, my younger friends, who are on the very threshold of active and responsible manhood, to dwell in a

* From Dante, ‘Inferno,’ iii. 95.

marked manner on the particular trials you will have to encounter. But the incidents of the time are no common incidents; and there is one among them so obtrusive, that youth cannot long enjoy its natural privilege of unacquaintance with the mischief, and so formidable, that it really requires to be forewarned against the danger. I refer to the extraordinary and boastful manifestation, in this age of ours, and especially perhaps in the year which is about to close, of the extremest forms of unbelief.

I am not about to touch upon the differences which distinguish, and partially sever, the Church of England from those communions by which it is surrounded; whether they be of Protestant Nonconformists, or of those who have recently incorporated into the Christian faith what we must suppose they think a bulwark and not a danger to religion, the doctrine of Papal infallibility. For handling controversies of such a class this is not the time, I am not the person, and my office is not the proper office. It is not now only the Christian Church, or only the Holy Scripture, or only Christianity, which is attacked. The disposition is boldly proclaimed to deal alike with root and branch, and to snap utterly the ties which, under the still venerable name of Religion, unite man with the unseen world, and lighten the struggles and the woes of life by the hope of a better land.

[These things are done as the professed results, and the newest triumphs, of Modern Thought and Modern Science; but I believe that neither Science nor Thought is responsible, any more than Liberty is responsible, for the misdeeds committed in their names. Upon the ground of what is termed evolution, God is relieved of the labour of creation; in the name of unchangeable laws, He is discharged from governing the world; and His function of judgment is also dispensed with, as justice and benevolence are held to forbid that men should hereafter be called to strict account for actions,

which under these unchangeable laws they may have committed. But these are only the initial stages of the process. Next, we are introduced to the doctrine of the Absolute and the Unconditioned; and, under the authority of these phrases (to which, and many other phrases, in their proper places, I have no objection) we are instructed that we can know nothing about God, and therefore can have no practical relations with Him. One writer, or, as it is now termed thinker, announces with pleasure that he has found the means of reconciling Religion and Science. The mode is in principle most equitable. He divides the field of thought between them. To Science he awards all that of which we know, or may know, something; to Religion he leaves a far wider domain,—that of which we know, and can know, nothing.* This sounds like jest, but it is melancholy earnest; and I doubt whether any such noxious crop has been gathered in such rank abundance from the press of England in any former year of our literary history as in this present year of our redemption, eighteen hundred and seventy-two.]

I will not, on this occasion, pain and weary you with a multitude of details. I will only refer by name to one who is not a British writer—to the learned German, Dr. Strauss. He is a man of far wider fame than any British writer who marches under the same banner; and I mention him with the respect which is justly due, not only to his ability, but to the straightforward earnestness, and to the fairness and mildness towards antagonists in argument, with which, so far as I have had the opportunity of judging him from his present or former works, he pursues his ill-starred and hopeless enterprise.

He has published, during the present year, a volume entitled 'The Old Belief and the New.'† In his Intro-

* See Illustrative Passages, A.

† 'Der alte und der neue Glaube: ein Bekenntniss.' Von David Friedrich Strauss. 2te Auflage. Leipzig, 1872.

duction, he frankly raises the question whether, considering the progress which culture has now made, there is any longer occasion to maintain religious worship* in any form whatever. Why, he asks, on behalf of a party in Germany, for which he speaks, and for which he claims that it answers most fully to the state of Modern Thought, should there be a separate religious society at all, when we have already provision made for all men in the State, the School, Science, and Fine Art? In his First Chapter he puts the question, "Are we still Christians?"† and, after a detailed examination, he concludes,—always speaking on behalf of Modern Thought,—that if we wish our yea to be yea and our nay nay,—if we are to think and speak our thoughts as honourable upright men, we must reply that we are Christians no longer.‡ This question and answer, however, he observes are insufficient. The essential and fundamental inquiry is, whether we are or are not still to have a Religion? §

To this inquiry he devotes his Second Chapter. In this Second Chapter, he finds that there is no personal God; || there is no future state: the dead live in the recollection of survivors: this is enough for them.¶ After this he has little difficulty in answering the question he has put. All religious worship ought to be abolished.** The very name of "Divine Service" is an indignity to man. Therefore, in the sense in which religion has been heretofore understood, his answer is that we ought to have no religion any more. But proceeding, as he always does, with commendable frankness, he admits that he ought to fill with something the void which he has made. This he accordingly proceeds to do. Instead of God, he offers to us the All, or Universum.†† This All or Universum possesses, he tells us, neither consciousness

* P. 7.

† P. 12 and chap. i.

‡ P. 94.

§ Chap. ii. p. 95.

|| Sec Illustrative Passages, B.

¶ P. 372.

** P. 144.

†† P. 146.

nor reason. But it presents to us order and law. He thinks it fitted, therefore, to be the object of a new and true piety, which he claims for his *Universum*, as the devout of the old style did for their God. If any one repudiates this doctrine, to Dr. Strauss's reason, the repudiation is absurdity, and to his feelings blasphemy.*

These are not the ravings of a maniac; nor are they the mere dreams of an imaginative high-wrought enthusiast such as Comte† appears to have been; they are the grave conclusions, after elaborate reasoning, of a learned, a calm, and, so far as form is concerned, a sober-minded man, who in this very year has been commended to us, in England, by another Apostle of Modern Thought as one of the men to whose guidance we ought, if we are wise, to submit ourselves in matter of religious belief.‡

I would not, gentlemen, even if I had the capacity and the time, make an attempt from this place to confute these astonishing assertions; for I have no fear that by their exhibition they will beguile or attract you. Neither do I search for the hard names of controversy to describe them; for they best describe themselves. Neither can I profess to feel an unmixed regret at their being forced, thus eagerly and thus early, into notice; because it is to be hoped that they will cause a shock and a reaction, and will compel many, who may have too lightly valued the inheritance so dearly bought for them, and may have entered upon dangerous paths, to consider, while there is yet time, whither those paths will lead them. In no part of his writings, perhaps, has Strauss been so effective, as where he assails the inconsistency of those who adopt his premises, but decline to follow him to their conclusions. Suffice it

* P. 146.

† Illustrative Passages, C.

‡ Willis's 'Life of Spinoza,' p. 26, note. See Illustrative Passages, D.

to say, these opinions are by no means a merely German brood;* there are many writers of kindred sympathies in England, and some of as outspoken courage. But, in preparing yourselves for the combat of life, I beg you to take this also into your account, that the spirit of denial is abroad, and that it has challenged all Religion, but especially the Religion we profess, to the combat of life and death.

But I venture to offer you a few suggestions, in the hope that they may not be wholly without their use.

You will hear in your after-life much of the duty and delight of following free thought; and in truth the man, who does not value the freedom of his thoughts, deserves to be described as Homer describes the slave; he is but half a man.† Saint Paul, I suppose, was a teacher of free thought, when he bade his converts to prove all things;‡ but it seems he went terribly astray when he proceeded to bid them “hold fast that which is good;” for he evidently assumed that there was something by which they could hold fast. And so he bade Timothy keep that which was committed to his charge;§ and another Apostle has instructed us to “earnestly contend for the faith which was once delivered unto the saints.”|| But the free thought, of which we now hear so much, seems too often to mean thought roving and vagrant more than free; like Delos, in the ancient legend, drifting on the seas of Greece, without a root, a direction, or a home.

Again, you will hear incessantly of the advancement of the present age, and of the backwardness of those which have gone before it. And truly it has been a wonderful age; but let us not exaggerate. It has been, and it is, an age of immense mental, as well as material activity; it

* See Illustrative Passages, E. † Odyss. x. 322. ‡ 1 Thess. v. 21.
 § 1 Tim. vi. 20. || Jude 3.

is by no means an age abounding in minds of the first order, in those whom time establishes as the great immortal guides and teachers of mankind. It has tapped, as it were, and made disposable for man, vast natural forces; but the mental power employed is not to be measured by the mere size of the results. To perfect that wonder of travel, the locomotive, has perhaps not required the expenditure of more mental strength and application, than to perfect that wonder of music, the violin. In the material sphere, the achievements of the age are splendid and unmixed. In the social sphere, they are great and noble; but seem ever to be confronted by a succession of new problems, which almost defy solution. In the sphere of pure intellect, I doubt whether posterity will rate us as highly as we rate ourselves. But that which I most wish to observe is this, that it is an insufferable arrogance in the men of any age to assume what I may call airs of unmeasured superiority over former ages. God, who cares for us, cared for them also. In the goods of this world we may advance by strides; but it is by steps only and not strides, and by slow and not always steady steps, that all durable improvement of man, in the higher ranges of his being, is alone to be effected.

Again, my friends, you will hear much to the effect that the divisions among Christians render it impossible to say what Christianity is, and so destroy all certainty as to what is the true religion. But if the divisions among Christians are remarkable, not less so is their unity in the greatest doctrines that they hold. Well-nigh fifteen hundred years—years of a more sustained activity than the world had ever before seen—have passed away, since the great controversies concerning the Deity and the Person of the Redeemer were, after a long agony, determined. As before that time in a manner less defined, but adequate for their day, so ever since that time, amid all chance and change, more, aye

many more, than ninety-nine in every hundred Christians have with one voice confessed the Deity and Incarnation of our Lord as the cardinal and central truths of our Religion. Surely there is some comfort here, some sense of brotherhood; some glory due to the past, some hope for the times that are to come.

On one, and only one, more of the favourite fallacies of the day I will yet presume to touch. It is the opinion and the boast of some that man is not responsible for his belief. Lord Brougham was at one time stated to have given utterance to this opinion. Whether truly, I do not remember; but this I know, it was my privilege to hear from his own lips the needful and due limitation of that proposition. "Man," he said, "is not responsible to man for his belief." But as before God, one and the same law applies to opinions and to acts; or rather to inward and to outward acts; for opinions are inward acts. Many a wrong opinion may be guiltless because formed in ignorance, and because that ignorance may not be our fault. But who shall presume to say that there is no mercy for wrong actions also, when they, too, have been due to ignorance, and that ignorance has not been guilty? The question is not whether judgments and actions are in the same *degree* influenced by the condition of the moral motives.* It is a question of the principle, on which judgment is to be based.

If it is undeniable that self-love and passion have an influence upon both, then, so far as that influence goes, for both we must be prepared to answer. Should we, in common life, ask a body of swindlers for an opinion upon swindling? or of gamblers for an opinion upon gambling? or of misers upon bounty? And if, in matters of religion, we allow pride and perverseness to raise a cloud between us and the truth

* See Illustrative Passages, F.

so that we see it not, the false opinion that we form is but the index of that perverseness and that pride, and both for them, and for it as their offspring, we shall be justly held responsible. Who may be the persons, upon whom this responsibility will fall, it is not ours to judge. These laws are given to us, not to apply presumptuously to others; it is enough if we enforce them honestly against ourselves.

Next to a Christian life, my friends, you will find your best defence against reckless novelty of speculation in sobriety of temper, and in sound intellectual habits. Be slow to stir inquiries, which you do not mean patiently to pursue to their proper end. Be not afraid oftentimes to suspend your judgment; or to feel and admit to yourselves how narrow are the bounds of knowledge. Do not too readily assume that to us have been opened royal roads to truth, which were heretofore hidden from the whole family of man; for the opening of such roads would not be so much in favour, as caprice. If it is bad to yield a blind submission to authority, it is not less an error to deny to it its reasonable weight. Eschewing a servile adherence to the past, regard it with reverence and gratitude; and accept its accumulations, alike in the inward and in the outward spheres, as the patrimony, which it is your part in life both to preserve and to improve.

A vote of thanks to Mr. Gladstone for the Address having been carried,

Mr. GLADSTONE, in reply, said :—Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, and my Friends of the College, I acknowledge with sincere gratitude the thanks you have been good enough to offer in a manner so pleasing to me; and I feel that they derive an additional value, not only from the kind remarks of the chairman, and his reference to former times, but also from the circumstance that the proposal was seconded by one

whose name stands so high upon the roll of the benefactors of this institution as our respected friend the Dean of Chester. I can truly declare, gentlemen, that when the Principal was good enough to propose to me that I should undertake this office, I did not look upon it as a matter of mere compliment or ceremony, but as one of very serious duty; and in that light it is that I have approached it, and have endeavoured to perform it. Further, I must say that it is always a source of pleasure to me to be called upon to perform, or to feel myself able to perform—which is not always the case—some act of public duty in Liverpool. I find cause for gratification in everything which refreshes my memory of the place, and strengthens my connection with it. It is not unnatural that I should feel a strong interest in Liverpool, where I have continually before me the recollection of my father, and where I also rejoice to know the presence of my Brother; nor is there any portion of the proceedings of this day which is more gratifying to my feelings than the manner in which reference has been made to my Brother, and the warmth of feeling with which that reference has been received. I trust that the connection between Liverpool and our family will long continue. Liverpool is, after all, but a very young place, when considered as the seat of a great community; but I see here some whose names have been well known in its history almost ever since it began to have one; and I hope that, as time goes on, Liverpool will have its old families like other places, famous for commerce in other times and countries, and like other districts of this country now. I know not why commerce in England should not have its old families, rejoicing to be connected with commerce from generation to generation. It has been so in other countries: I trust it will be so in this country. I think it a subject of sorrow, and almost a scandal, when those families, which have either acquired or

recovered station and opulence through commerce turn their backs upon it, and seem to be ashamed of it. It certainly is not so with my Brother or with me. His sons are treading in his steps, and one of my sons, I rejoice to say, is treading in the steps of my Father and my Brother. I hope, therefore, gentlemen, you will see that we are not unfaithful to the cause, and to the place with which we have been so long familiar. In the task I have discharged to-day, I have not studied the arts of flattery. I have endeavoured to practise that plain speaking which I know is dear to Englishmen, and I trust it will be given to many of you whom I see now before me upon the threshold of their life, to become an ornament and an honour to this place, and to give a good practical demonstration to the world that the pursuit of commerce and the interests of human cultivation are not alien from one another, but are, on the contrary, harmoniously allied. (Loud applause.)

ILLUSTRATIVE PASSAGES.

A.—p. 23.

RELIGION AND SCIENCE.

My reference is to Mr. Herbert Spencer. See his 'First Principles,' and especially the chapter on the "Reconciliation of Science and Religion." It is needless to cite particular passages. It would be difficult to mistake its meaning; for it is written with great ability and clearness, as well as with every indication of sincerity. Still it vividly recalls to mind an old story of the man who, wishing to be rid of one who was in his house, said, "Sir, there are two sides to my house, and we will divide them; you shall take the outside."

I believe Mr. Spencer has been described in one of our daily journals as the first thinker of the age.

B.—p. 24.

THE RECENT WORK OF DR. STRAUSS.

These passages are given as specimens of the work of Dr. Strauss, rather than as supplying the body of proof of the propositions set forth in the text of the Address; and I would remind the reader that Dr. Strauss may protest against being bound by a rendering into another language for which he is not responsible, although I do not think any defects in the translation will be found to affect the substance.

The "We" of Dr. Strauss in this work is not according to the common editorial use of the pronoun, but is meant, as I understand it, to mark the work throughout as the manifesto of a party.

I.

THE RESURRECTION.

"Seldom has an incredible occurrence been worse testified ; never has one ill testified been intrinsically more incredible. I have, in my 'Life of Jesus,' appropriated to this subject a searching scrutiny, which I will not here repeat. The upshot of it alone I hold it to be my duty, as well as my right, to declare without any sort of reserve. Viewed historically, that is to say, when the prodigious results of this belief are taken together with its total want of foundation, the narrative of the Resurrection of Jesus can only be described as a world-wide humbug (*welthistorischer Humbug*)."—p. 79.

II.

RELIGIOUS WORSHIP.

"Why is it, then, that we ought to have no worship in future ? Because we have broken loose from the other constituent part of Religion, which is also the untrue and, in relation to the sentiment of independence, the more ignoble part of it—namely, the desire and the idea that, through our worship, we may be enabled to extract something from our God. We need only take the expression 'Divine Service,' and acquire a perception of the grovelling anthropopathism it involves, in order to perceive how and for what reason anything of that kind is no longer admissible from our point of view."—p. 144.

III.

PIETY TOWARDS THE UNIVERSUM.

"We have been seeking to determine, whether our point of view, from which the law-governed All, full of life and intelligence, is the summit of thought (*die höchste Idee*), can still be called a religious point of view : and we have animadverted upon Schopenhauer, who loses no opportunity of

flying in the face of this which is our Idea. As I have said, such outbreaks impress our understanding as absurdities; to our feelings, they are blasphemies. It appears to us rash and reckless, on the part of a mere human individual, so boldly to set himself up against the All, out of which he grows, and from which he has the morsel of intelligence that he misuses. We see in this an abnegation of that feeling of dependence, which we admit to belong to all men. We demand the same Piety towards our 'Universum, as the devout man of the old fashion did for his God.'—p. 146.

IV.

THE BIBLE.

"Men think they understand the Bible, because they are habituated to not understanding it. Moreover, the modern reader brings to it as much edifying force as he derives from it. Not even to mention books like the Revelation of John, and most of the Prophets of the Old Testament, surely it is not meant to say that Lessing's 'Nathan,' or Goethe's 'Hermann und Dorothea,' is harder to understand, or contains fewer "saving truths," fewer golden sayings, than an Epistle of Paul, or a discourse of Christ according to John."—p. 299.

V.

THE FUTURE STATE.

"As regards the substitute, which our view of things offers for the Church's belief in immortality, the reader may perhaps expect from me a very lengthened explanation, but will have to content himself with a very short one. He who in this point cannot practise self-help, is not yet ready for our standing-point. He for whom, on the one hand, it is not enough to be allowed to vitalise within himself the everlasting ideas of the Universum, and of the course of development (*Entwicklungsgang*), and the destiny, appointed for

humanity; he who knows not how to create within himself, for the dead whom he loves and honours, a continuation of life and action in its finest form (*das schönste Fortleben und Fortwirken*); he in whom, together with exertion for his family, with labour in his calling, with contribution to the welfare of his nation, as well as to the good of his fellow-men at large, and with enjoyment of the Beautiful in Nature and Art—he, I say, in whom, with all this there does not on the other hand arise the consciousness, that he himself can only be called to be a temporary partner in it all; he who cannot prevail upon himself, finally, to bid his adieu to life with thankfulness for having been permitted for a time to act, to enjoy, and also to suffer in unison with all this, and at the same time with a devout sense of liberation from what, in the long-run is, after all, but exhausting day-labour; such a man, I say, we must remit to Moses and the Prophets; who, to boot, knew nothing of an immortal life, yet Moses and the Prophets still they were.”—p. 372.

(I have not ventured to tamper with the syntax of this passage.)

C.—p. 25.

THE SYSTEM OF COMTE.

Having given Comte credit for imagination, I must confess that, I did not suppose him to be of “imagination all compact,”* but rather of imagination all diffuse. I had in view his width of sympathies and disposition to sympathise, his avowed regard for Veneration, his priesthood, his incorporation of the priestly vocation with the function of the poet, his calendar, and his woman-worship, as he has developed them in his ‘Catechism of Positivism’ [I refer to the English translation by Mr. Congreve], which he put forth as a sum-

* ‘Midsummer Night’s Dream,’ v. 1.

mary of his previously published volumes, and an anticipation of those which were to follow. (Preface, pp. 12, 37.) Strauss appears to me to be indebted, in a certain degree, to Comte, but to be rather shy of owning the acquaintance.

D.—p. 25.

OUR RELIGIOUS GUIDES.

I quote this passage from Willis's 'Life of Spinoza,' p. 26, note:—

"An entirely truthful and authoritative interpretation of the Hebrew Scriptures is an imperative want of the age in which we live, and has now become the first condition required to enable the world to escape from the slough of superstition on the one hand, and irreligiousness on the other, in which it is helplessly sunk, and is sinking more and more deeply every day, despite the well-meant efforts of the pious laity and zealous ministry of all denominations. We have set *authoritative* beside *truthful* in the sentence above, for we are possessed of even more than one perfectly truthful and exhaustive, but of no authoritative interpretation of the Hebrew Scriptures and Greek Testament; neither can the world at large have any such, until the hierarchies of the Christian Churches agree to associate themselves with Spinoza, Semler, Lessing, De Wette, Ewald, Strauss, Baur, Kuenen, Keim, Renan, and Colenso—critics and scholars all, men of noble lives, clear heads, and pious souls, who, from the fulness of their hearts and depths of their understandings, have spoken to their fellow-men in terms which all might understand, but which ignorance, superstition, and false direction prevent them from apprehending in their inappreciable worth and importance. Authority would indeed seem indispensable to the mass of mankind; but no holy reunion of cultivated men for such a purpose is possible, unless it be based on acknowledgment of the common father-

hood of God, and recognise the revelation He makes of His being and attributes for all time, in no mere spoken words or written records, but in the mind of man, the order of the universe, and the great laws that, by His fiat, rule it necessarily, changelessly, and everlastingly."

E.—p. 26.

I have made a statement that these ideas are not a mere German brood ; though I fear that we owe much of their seed to Germany, as France owed to England the seed of her great Voltairian movement, so far as it was a movement grounded in the region of thought. This statement, as it is given in the text, I will support only by extracts from a single writer, Mr. Winwood Reade. They are taken from his 'Martyrdom of Man.' The three first bear upon creed. I quote the fourth, with reference to the last of the three inventions he desires and anticipates, as an instance of what seems to me a want of sobriety of mind, exhibited in a region where it will be better appreciated than if it bore directly upon matters of religion.

It would have been easy to quote from other writers. Perhaps, in sparing myself that task, I make the reference to Mr. Reade more invidious. But my purpose is information, not reproach. Happily we are not now as in the days of Edward VI., when Philpot, who had himself taken what were deemed considerable liberties with the established religion, spat in the face of an Arian, and defending himself in print, said : "I would I had a quantity of spittle to spattle on them."

I must add that Mr. Reade writes with an ability amply sufficient to defend him from wrong.

I.

"When the faith in a personal God is extinguished ; when prayer and praise are no longer to be heard ; when the

belief is universal that with the body dies the soul; then the false morals of theology will no longer lead the human mind astray.”—‘The Martyrdom of Man,’ p. 535.

II.

“We teach that the soul is immortal; we teach that there is a future life; we teach that there is a Heaven in the ages far away; but not for us single corpuscles, not for us dots of animated jelly, but for the One of whom we are the elements, and who though we perish never dies.”—p. 537.

III.

“God is so great that He does not deign to have personal relations with us human atoms that are called men. Those who desire to worship their Creator must worship Him through mankind. Such, it is plain, is the scheme of Nature.”—p. 537.

IV.

“Three inventions, which perhaps may long be delayed, but which possibly are near at hand, will give to this overcrowded island the prosperous conditions of the United States. The first is the discovery of a motive force which will take the place of steam, with its cumbrous fuel of oil and coal; secondly, the invention of aerial locomotion, which will transport labour at a trifling cost of money and of time, to any part of the planet, and which, by annihilating distance, will speedily extinguish national distinctions; and thirdly, the manufacture of flesh and flour from the elements, by a chemical process in the laboratory similar to that which is now performed within the bodies of the animals and plants.”—p. 513.

F.—p. 28.

AUTHORITY IN ITS RELATION TO REASON.

The general subject of Authority, and its place not as an antagonist of Reason, but as an instrument of Reason for the attainment of Truth, is very ably handled in the opening chapters of the work of Sir George C. Lewis, 'On the Influence of Authority in Matters of Opinion.'

Though I am not able to follow him in every one of his applications of the principle, I could wish his reasonings were better known to the world than, unfortunately, they can now be, from the extreme scarcity of the work.

He remarks, in p. 35, "It is commonly said that the belief is independent of the will," and that no man can change it "by merely wishing it to be otherwise." But "the operation of a personal interest may cause a man insensibly to adopt prejudices or partial and unexamined opinions." In p. 38 he adds, "Napoleon affords a striking instance of the corruption of the judgment in consequence of the misdirection of the moral sentiments."

A FEW REMARKS
ON
THE PRONUNCIATION OF LATIN
WITH A POSTSCRIPT

BY

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THE following Remarks, privately distributed some months ago, I now publish with a postscript, in the endeavour to comply so far as is in my power with the request of the headmasters of schools who met at Sherborne last year. To ensure complete uniformity in the pronunciation of Latin is an impossibility: it is a delusion to suppose that there is a foreign as opposed to an English method. In England itself there is no one unvarying system. If the scheme which is proposed in the Oxford circular, as finally revised by the Oxford Philological Society, be taken to represent the minimum of change desirable, and some such scheme as is sketched out in the following pages be placed at the other extreme, the whole intervening ground might I think be covered without exhibiting much greater differences in practice than exist among us at present. At the same time it seems to me desirable to endeavour in theory after a worthy ideal; and the most essential part of such an endeavour is in my opinion to take for our standard the Italian vowel system, if even in practice we should many of us fall short of it.

IN discussing the pronunciation of a dead language it is well to remember 'the shrewd Sicilian's' *Νᾶφε καὶ μέμνασ' ἀπιστεῖν*. And I should probably have gone on to the end of my life in being sober and mistrustful in this matter, if it had not been forced on my attention from many different quarters which I could not disregard. Nearly two years ago Mr Cornish of Eton, in his own name and that of several of his colleagues, urged me to print something on the matter. For many reasons I declined at the time to enter on so slippery a course. Soon after some friends here, to whose judgment I could not but defer, among them Dr Lightfoot and our Public Orator, pressed me to try a reform. Thus stimulated I gave some lectures on the subject more than a year ago, and ever since have continued in lecturing to adhere to the system I then traced out. Last term Professor Palmer wrote to me that they were thinking of a reform at Oxford: at his request I sent a pretty full summary of the plan I pursued. This was received with very great courtesy by him and the distinguished Committee appointed to consider the matter. They were not however inclined to go so far as I had gone; and they have since circulated a private paper stating what course they were disposed to recommend. It is with reference especially to this paper that I print these remarks. Personally I should have been disposed to bow at once to such high authority; but I have been almost forced to move for the following reasons. On the one hand the Head-Master of Winchester, wrote to me a month ago to inform me that 'at a conference of Schoolmasters held at Sherborne this Christmas...it was resolved to ask the Latin Professors of Oxford and Cambridge to issue a joint scheme of Latin pronunciation, to ensure uniformity in any changes contemplated'. On the other hand not only did I think myself, but I found it to be the general opinion of those whom I consulted, such as Dr Lightfoot, Mr John E. Mayor, Mr Jebb, Mr

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Cornish, that we might with advantage push reform farther than the Oxford paper proposes. Mr Mayor says 'I confess that I would rather keep to our existing pronunciation than accept any compromise'. Lastly that distinguished scholar and grammarian Mr H. J. Roby has published a paper, in which he declares himself in favour of a complete scheme of reform. It is with great diffidence therefore that I issue these remarks, for the sole purpose of allowing the questions involved to be considered and discussed.

I wish then to declare my full concurrence in the changes proposed in the Oxford paper and my reasons for going still farther. I hold that reform, whether partial or complete, should be undertaken for its own sake and the sake of the ancient language, not to make ourselves more intelligible to 'other Latin-reading nations', who are not intelligible to each other without special cultivation. A Frenchman's Latin is at first as unintelligible to an Italian, as ours is, and more absurd; a Spaniard cannot be understood by Frenchman or Italian; a Scotchman's brogue, while retaining something of the proper vowel sounds, has most of our own disagreeable peculiarities, is unpleasing and but partially intelligible to us, and cannot be understood by Spaniard, Frenchman or Italian¹.

Are we then (and this is a vital question) to endeavour to observe quantity systematically, to distinguish between long and short, and longer and shorter, syllables? If this is to be done, we must break alike with all existing pronunciations, Italian as well as English. The tyranny of the accent over quantity is perhaps more marked in the Italian than in our own reading of Latin. We learn from Cicero and Quintilian that rhythm or a due admixture of long and short syllables was important in prose as well as verse; and for myself, by observing quantity, I seem to feel more keenly the beauty of Cicero's style and Livy's, as well as Virgil's and Horace's. The same I find to be the case with those in whose judgment and knowledge I confide. Mr Mayor writes to me: 'As regards quantity, C. of Shrewsbury, a most experienced and intelligent teacher of elementary classics, tells me that since he has made his boys distinguish *cāno*, *cānis* and *cānus*, *lēgo*, *lēgis* and *lēx*, *lēgis*, and sound

¹ I have a sufficient knowledge of the ordinary Scotch method and care for no contradiction however flat. If in Edinburgh or elsewhere any profess a superfine system, acceptable alike to gods and men, to Spaniard, Italian and ancient Roman, that is not Scotch, but some ideal which common mortals would fain attain to, but cannot.

all long syllables long, and short short, in whatever positions, he finds them perfect in quantity for verse composition'.

Though we break however with all existing systems, Italian appears to me to offer many valuable aids which it would be most unwise to neglect. English seems so utterly different in all its tones, its entire vocalisation, from old Latin, that often we cannot find in it even single sounds to give as the representative of a Latin sound. The Italian of literature has been fixed for six centuries; the more we examine the two, the more we feel that the Romano-Tuscan of to-day is essentially the Latin of the 7th or 8th century; that 'Siede la terra dove nata fui' must represent very nearly the 7th century pronunciation of 'sedet (il)laterra deúbì nata fui'; that race and climate and much else have made the 'lingua Toscana in bocca Romana' to inherit in a higher degree than any other language the refinements of old Latin. Let me not be misunderstood: I feel most strongly the truth of Dr Ridding's judicious words, when he writes: 'the point which would be likely to cause the greatest difficulties, would be very subtle distinctions of shades of vowel sounds. But if any such were proposed, we should have to let boys be rough in it, and they would be rough in it. I feel there is so much to be said in favour of doing a thing as thoroughly as possible, that I would say no more than just this, that a subtle foreign pronunciation will not be realized at school I think'. What I mean is this: our English sounds are so different from what we must suppose the old Latin to have been, that, by looking only to them, we should probably fall into such slipshod ways as to make our new pronunciation hardly better, perhaps more distasteful than our present. I do not propose that every one should learn Italian in order to learn Latin. What I would suggest is that those who know Italian, should make use of their knowledge and should in many points take Italian sounds for the model to be followed; that those who do not know it, should try to learn from others the sounds required, or such an approximation to them as may be possible in each case.

In seeking to recover in some degree the old pronunciation, we have many great advantages in Latin, compared with Greek: 1. from the literature developing itself comparatively late, and so not stereotyping the orthography: we see in the first volume of the *Corpus inscr. Latin.* a map as it were of the language spread open

before us, and feel sure that change of spelling meant systematical change of pronunciation: *coira*, *coera*, *cura*; *aiguos*, *aequos*, *aecus*; *queiquomque*, *quicumque*, etc. etc.: 2. from the far less complexity of sounds, diphthongs mostly disappearing and the two chief ones left, *ae* and *au*, being easy to pronounce: 3. from the invaluable service the Italians have rendered us in keeping the accent in most cases on the right syllable, even while changing its nature. Many of us I fear are quite unconscious of the debt we owe them; but, had we been left to our own lights, the confusion in Latin might have been as disastrous as in Greek. In observing quantity we shall still keep the accent in its proper place, but its tyrannical predominance will be abated.

At first the Latins seem to have been careless enough in matters of grammar and pronunciation. From the time of Ennius onwards this nation of grammarians devoted so much pains and attention to these matters that by the time of Cicero and Virgil the language had attained a perfection as great as that of Attic in its palmiest days. The slurring over of final syllables, once its great weakness, had been so much corrected by careful culture that, if Virgil's antiquarian prejudices had not stood in the way, we may infer from the example of Ovid that elision of long syllables and many short ones would have almost disappeared. Every change in pronunciation seems to have been carefully marked by a change in the spelling. We may thus I think approximate to the true pronunciation. This approximation, it may be said, will after all be a rude one. Very well: that may be an argument for doing nothing at all; but not I think, if we try a reform, for doing it imperfectly. With this preface I will proceed to shew where it seems to me we might safely go beyond the Oxford circular in correcting our pronunciation of the different letters: after that I will say a few words about quantity, accent and elision.

'*ā* should have the sound of *a* in *father*: *ǣ* that of the first *a* in *papa*'. As the first *a* of *papa* would seem in English mouths to be sometimes a short *a*, sometimes a short *i*, sometimes a short *u*, and as it is well to accustom the English to open the mouth and expand the chest, I would add: or still better, *ā* should have the sound of the accentuated, *ǣ* of the unaccentuated Italian *a*: *amāta*, *pādre*, *padrōne*. Of course *ǣ* and every short vowel should be pronounced short, when the syllable in which they occur is only lengthened by position.

'*ē* (and *ae*) should have the sound of *a* in *cake*: *ē* of the first *a* in *aerial*.' The first *a* of *aerial* has to my ear a very vague sound: I would add: or better, let *ē* have the sound of the Italian closed *e* (*é*): *ē*, whether the syllable is short or lengthened by position, and *ae* that of the Italian open *e* (*è*): *aréna*, *ridé*, but *bèné*, *tèmèrè*: *ést* ('eats'), but *èst* ('is'); *léctus* (partic.), but *lèctus* ('bed'): *Caèsar*, *musàè*, *Aèaèaè*. Thus in Italian as a rule *é* represents the long, *è* represents the short Latin *e*; while Latin *ae* is *invariably* represented by *è*: *Cèsare*, *sècolo*, etc. Diez compares the German *lehen*, *wegen* for the open, *legen*, *heben* for the close *e*. In English perhaps *pear* will give a notion of open, *pain* of close *e*. In Italian they do not distinguish between naturally long and short vowels, when the syllables are long by position; but we should do so in Latin I think: *méns*, *mèntis*. In Italian too the open and close sounds are only perceived in the accentuated syllables.

In Lucilius' time the rustics said *Cecilius pretor* for *Caecilius praetor*: in two Samothracian inscriptions older than B.C. 100 (the sound of *ai* by that time verging to an open *e*), we find *muste piei* and *muste*: in similar inscriptions *μύσται piei*, and *mystae*: *Paeligni* is reproduced in Strabo by *Πελιγνοί*: Cicero, Virgil, Festus and Servius all alike give *caestus* for *κεστός*: by the first century, perhaps sooner, *e* was very frequently put for *ae* in words like *taeter*: we often find *teter*, *erumna*, *mestus*, *presto* and the like: soon inscriptions and Mss. began pertinaciously to offer *ae* for *ē*: *praetium*, *praeces*, *quaerella*, *aegestas* and the like, the *ae* clearly representing a short and very open *e*: sometimes it stands for a long *e*, as often in *plaenus*, the liquid before and after making perhaps the *e* more open (*σκηνή* is always *scaena*): and it is from this form *plaenus* that in Italian, contrary to the usual law of long Latin *e*, we have *pièno* with open *e*. With such a pedigree then, and with the genuine Latin *ae* *always* represented in Italian by open *e*, can we hesitate to pronounce the *ae* with this open *e* sound?

'*ī* should have the sound of *e* in *he*, *ī* of *e* in *behalf*': I should prefer: *ī* shall have the sound of the accentuated, *ī* of the unaccentuated Italian *ì*: *tímidi*.

'*ō* and *ō* should be sounded as at present': in this I cannot acquiesce: what is the present *ō*? *non*, *bos*, *pons*, *honor*? or, *nos*, *hos*, *domos*? these *o*'s we English utter with totally different sounds: we have scarcely in English or in English-Latin a genuine *o*, except per-

haps before *r*: *roar*, *mores*: then what is our Anglo-Latin *ō*? how does *o* differ in *dōmum* and *dōnum*? Here too the close and open Italian *o* represent respectively the long and short Latin *o*, on the exact analogy of *e*. Let us then represent *ō* by the close, *o* by the open Italian *o*: the name of the painter Benózzo Gózzoli gives a specimen of the two *o*'s. Or I care not if we take the long and short German *o*: *ōhne*, *göld*: for our purpose. Here too *au* has a curious analogy with *ae*: the Latin *au* becomes in Italian open *o*: *òro*, *òde*: I would pronounce thus in Latin: *plōstrum*, *Clōdīus*, *cōrus*. Perhaps too the fact that *gloria*, *vittoria* and the common termination *-orio* have in Italian the open *o*, might shew that the corresponding *ō* in Latin was open by coming between two liquids, or before one: compare *plenus* above.

'*ū* should have the sound of *o* in *who*, *ū* of *u* in *fruition*': or, of accentuated and unaccentuated Italian *u* respectively: *tūmulo*, *tumúlto*. For that large class of words, comprising all superlatives and many other kinds of nouns and of verbs, Quintilian (I, 4, 8) gives a valuable hint: 'there is a middle sound between *u* and *i*'; for we do not pronounce *optimum* (*optumum*) either as *optimum*, or as *optumum*.'

'*au* should have the sound of *ow* in *owl*'; I should prefer the Italian *au* which gives more of the *u*, than our *owl*, *cow*.

'*eu* should be sounded as at present': for Greek words, adopted into Latin, let Greek authorities tell us what is right: of Latin words there are but two or three, *heu*, *ceu*, *seu*: I prefer the Italian *eu* which gives you more of the *e*, than the English *you* sound of these words does: '*ui* as *we* in *we*': here too in Latin we have but two or three small words, *cui*, *hui*, *phui*, *huic*.

'*oe* should have the sound of *a* in *cake*': here too (putting Greek words out of the question), when hateful barbarisms like *coelum*, *coena*, *moestus* are eliminated, *oe* occurs very rarely in Latin: *coepi*, *poena*, *moenia*, *coetus*, *proelia*, besides archaisms *coera*, *moerus* etc., where *oe*, coming from *oi*, passed into *u*. If we must have a simple sound, I should take the open *e* sound which I have given to *ae*: but I should prefer one like the German *ö*. Their rarity however makes the sound of *oe*, *eu*, *ui* of less importance.

'*ei* should have the sound of *i* in *idle*': surely this cannot be right. But this too is a diphthong which has practically disappeared from Latin, owing to the people's dislike to complex sounds: we find *hei* (more correctly *ei*): *ei* (dat.) and *rei* are sometimes monosyllables,

and Horace has *Pompei*, *Voltei*, Virgil *Penei*. But in the older language there are thousands of *ei*'s, later *i* or *e*: surely we are not to pronounce all these with the English *i* sound, in defiance alike of euphony and consistency. I should infinitely prefer either the Latin and Italian long *e*, or long *i*; i.e. to pronounce *omneis* either as *omnes* or *omnis*. But as the diphthong is important, I would much rather give it the Italian or Latin *e* sound quickly followed by an Italian or Latin *i* sound. Then there is an important class of words of which the Oxford paper takes no note: are we to give the English *i* sound to such forms as *eius*, *Pompeius*, *Seianus*? And here I will take together a large class of similar words in *ai*, *ei*, *oi*, *ui*, which have really two *i*'s, a vowel and a consonant, and which in old times were often so written, as we see in inscriptions and good Mss.: Quintilian tells us that Cicero preferred '*aiio Maiiamque geminata i scribere*'; and we know from Priscian that Cæsar in his *de analogia* spelt *Pompeii* (gen.) with three *i*'s, and explained how they were all to be pronounced. We English shew in these words our usual undaunted inconsistency: we say *Maia* but *major*, *Gravius* but *Troja*, *eius* but *Pompeius*; *Seius*, while we call his son *Sejanus*. In such words the *i* has a double force, that of the vowel together with that of the consonant *i* (our *y*): the Greeks always write Πομπήιος, not Πομπειος. In all these cases I conclude we should give the long Latin or Italian *a*, *e*, *i* sound respectively, followed by an English *y* or Italian *j* sound: *Grā-yus*, *Mā-ya*, *mā-yor*, *Trō-ya* (this word has the open *o* sound in Italian), *ē-yus*, *Pompē-yus*, *Sē-yanus*, *cū-yus*. So with the compounds of *iacio*: *ē-yicit*, *āb-yicit*, *rē-yicit*; though we should always write them with a single *i*: *eicit* etc.: *Gāiūs* is a dactyl, *Caius* a nonentity. The *o* or *e* of *proin*, *proinde*, *prout*, *dein*, *deinde*, when not forming a distinct syllable, is elided, does not form a diphthong, and must be treated as cases of elision between two words: in *neūtquam* *e* is elided as much as in *numquam*, *nullus*: the Greek *eu* and *yi* I refuse to pronounce upon.

We come now to consonants: the Oxford paper proposes that the consonant *i*, or *j*, should have the sound of *y* in *yard*: that consonant *u*, or *v*, should be sounded as at present. That we should sound consonant *i* as our *y* I am quite agreed: equally persuaded am I that we should give consonant *u* the nearest sound possible to the vowel *u*, the sound that is of our English *w*. This I hold to be called for by the whole inner structure of the language: comp. *iuvēnis*, *iunior*;

noverat, norat; motus, momen, nuntius, nundinae, etc. etc.: by the fact that the Greeks employed their *ov* to form words which must have been utterly barbarous to their ears, in order to reproduce precisely the Roman sounds: *Οὐαληνς, ἄδουεντος*, and many others even more repulsive: lastly by clear external evidence. Gellius is fond of quoting Cicero's friend Nigidius Figulus, next to Varro the most learned of the Romans. Now the passage about the vowels cited by Gellius at the end of his 19th book seems to me to shew that the consonant *u* in *Valerius*, etc. had the same relation to the vowel, as the *i* of *iecur*, etc. had to the vowel *i*; and that in both cases they were as near to the vowel sound as they could well be. Still more convincing is the curious passage in X 4: unless *vos* was sounded *wōs*, the story would seem to have no point or meaning. Now Gellius quoting Figulus covers the whole classical period. Why should we then renounce the advantage we have over others in our *w*, surely a nobler sound, to us at least, than *v*?

The circular shrinks from giving *c* and *g* uniformly the sound of *k* and hard *g*; and leaves *ci* and *ti* (and ? *si*) before another vowel to be sounded as at present. As for special reasons I have spoken of these points so fully in an Appendix, I will only say that, since *ken*, *kin*, *get*, *give* are such genuine English sounds, I see no reason for not allowing them in Latin, and many reasons for the contrary; and that our *rashios*, *fashiams* and the like are hardly compatible with a reformed system.

The circular does not touch on other consonants: I wish to make a few remarks on some of them: *bs*, *bt* should always be sounded, generally written, *ps*, *pt*: *lapsus*, *aps*, *apsens*, *apstulit*, *Araps*, *urps*, *opscenus*, *optulit*, *supter*: and generally assimilation should take place in pronunciation, if not in spelling; *acc-*, not *adc-*, *imm-*, *imp-*, *coll-* etc.

d and *t* we treat with our usual slovenliness, and force them up to the roof of our mouth: we should make them real dentals, as no doubt the Romans made them, and then we see how readily *ad at*, *apud aput*, *illud illut* and the like interchange: *f* seems from what Quintilian says to have been sounded with a stronger breath than we employ; but I suggest no change: *m* before *q* had a nasal sound: *quamquam*, *numquam*: final *m* was sounded slightly and indistinctly, as is proved by its elision and the testimony of grammarians: *quu*

I avoid, pronouncing *cu* or *quo*: *cum* or *quom*, *ecus* or *equos*: *r* we should sound more strongly and distinctly than we do at present.

Of *s* I would say a few words, as it has many interesting analogies in Italian: *s* between two vowels has in Italian and French a soft *z* sound like our *rose*: I would thus sound it between two vowels in Latin: *rosa*, *musa*, *miser*. But words of this kind in Latin are comparatively very few, and in Italian there are most suggestive exceptions to *s* being soft between two vowels: in *cosa*, *riso*, etc. and in the adjective termination *-oso* it is sounded as our *s* in *sad*: these words represent *causa* (*caussa*), *risus* (*rissus*), examples of that very large class of which Quintilian (I 7, 20) speaks: he tells us that Cicero and Virgil wrote *cassus*, *caussae*, *divisiones*. There are vast numbers of such words, in which *ss* was the original spelling, a lost consonant having been assimilated, and the vowel was always long. The old Latin pronunciation seems to have been to dwell on the long vowel or diphthong, and sound the *ss* as a single sharp *s*, as in the Italian words quoted: *cau-ssa*, *cā-ssus*, *mī-sit* (*mī-ssit*), *mī-ssus*, *iū-ssus*, *rū-sum* (*ru-ssum*) for *rūrsum*, *odīo-sus* (*-ssus*) etc. etc.: the *ss* and *s* seem to have been sounded alike. At the beginning and end of words too, and at the beginning of syllables, and before consonants, *s* is always sharp in Italian, and should be so in Latin: *sol*, *stella*, *de-sero*, *nī-si*, *qua-si*, *bos*, *nos*, *sonus*.

There are 5 letters or unions of letters wholly alien to the old language and brought into it for the sole purpose of reproducing precisely Greek sounds: *y*, *z*, *ch*, *ph*, *th*: we have abundant evidence that *y*, or Greek *υ*, had some sound between *i* and *u*, probably like either French *u* or German *ü*; and one of these sounds I should wish to give it. Of *z* I do not feel competent to speak. The modern Greeks sound *θ*, *φ* as we do, *χ* like a strong Scotch guttural: in old Greek and Latin it seems to be generally agreed that the tenues *c*, *p*, *t* were distinctly sounded and an *h* sound appended. I should not venture to suggest such a pronunciation for Latin *ph* and *th*; but should prefer it for *ch*, as this would not be a difficult sound, and the Scotch or German guttural is strange to the English tongue.

gn was sounded as we sound it, not as the Italians and French pronounce it. Though I do not propose to change the sound of *n* before *c* and *g*: *anceps*, *ango* and the like; it seems to have been nasal, nearer a *g* sound, and many grammarians wished to write *ageps*, *aggo*, *aggulus*, as the Greeks actually did for similar reasons:

ἄγγελος, ἐγκρατής; though oddly enough both Italians and modern Greeks have here a clear *n* sound.

In modern Latin pronunciation quantity is systematically neglected: attention to it seems to me essential in any reformed method, attention too to the natural length of vowels when long by position. In Latin there is no *η* or *ω*, Lucilius unluckily for us having laughed out of fashion the poet Accius' invention for noting naturally long syllables by doubling them, though we find many traces of this in the older inscriptions: *Maarcus, paastores*: so *ee* for *ē*, *I* for *ī*, as *vIximus* as well as *vIvo*: *ou* for *ū* as *poublicom*. Apices were often used afterwards in all ages to mark naturally long syllables: *Mártis, fécerit*: both these usages are noted by Quintilian. We know too that the vowel of the supine and cognate parts of the verb was always long by nature, if the vowel of the present indic. though short was followed by a medial: *aactus, leectus* (partic.), but *factus, lectus* (subst.): Cicero (Orator § 159) tells us also that *every* vowel when followed by *ns* or *nf* became long by nature: *Insanus, Infelix*, but *indoctus: coonsuevit, coonfecit*, but *composuit*. And this is borne out by abundant other evidence: we find in Greek Κλήμης Κλήμεντος, Ούάληνς Ούάλεντος and the like. Priscian too (II 63) tells us that *gn* made the preceding vowel long by nature: *reegnum, staagnum, benIgnus, malIgnus, abieegnus, privIgnus*: and this is confirmed by our finding in inscriptions more than once the apex of a naturally long vowel attached to *regni, regno*, and also *sIgna, dIgni*, and in Greek the form Πῆγνοι: we must not be misled by the wrong accents Μάρκος for Μᾶρκος, Μάγνος for Μᾶγνος, there being conclusive testimony for the length of the vowel. The rhythm of prose as well as verse will be improved, if we attend to such points: *amaans amaan-tis, doceens doceentis, legeens audieens*, but *legentis audientis; amaan-dus, doceendus*, but *legendus, audiendus*: *Moonstrum horreendum Informe ingeens: Insontem Infaandoo indicioo*, and the like. An extruded consonant too often leaves a naturally short vowel long: *ex, ee; sex, seescenti, seemis; Sextius, Seestius* (σησιτιωδέστερον nihil novi); *ees, eest* from *edo*. By comparing Cicero (de orat. III § 183) with Quintilian (I, 5, 18) we learn that in the time of the former the prose pronunciation was *illius, unius*, etc.: in the time of the latter *illius, unius*; he and subsequent grammarians holding the shortening to be a poetical licence.

Plautus and Terence, following the usage of common life, never

lengthen a short vowel before a mute and liquid: compare on this point Aristophanes with Euripides, Euripides with Homer: and in prose we should always keep such syllables short. When in the learned verse such syllables are lengthened, we should still sound the vowel short, and lengthen the syllable by separating distinctly the two consonants: *Gnatum ante ora patris, pat-rem: Et Lycum nig-ris oculis nigroque: similis volūcri, nunc vera volūc-ris.*

The Italians, as I have already observed, have done us an incalculable service by keeping in most cases the accent on the right syllable, though the loss of quantity has changed its nature. It would be well to recal the accent to the right place in the cases where we now neglect to do so; to draw it forward towards enclitics: *armáque, omniáve* as well as *armísque; tantáne*; to pronounce *tantón, posthác, postéa, praeteréa, adéo* (adv.), *quiprímus abóris, intersé, apudmést*, etc.

In respect of elision I would only say that, by comparing Plautus with Ovid, we may see how much the elaborate cultivation of the language had tended to a more distinct sounding of final syllables; and that but for Virgil's powerful influence the elision of long vowels would have almost ceased. Clearly we must not altogether pass over the elided vowel or syll. in *m*, except perhaps in the case of *ē* in common words, *que, neque* and the like.

In conclusion I would repeat that, if we are to reform our pronunciation at all, it would be well to do it as thoroughly as we can, and get rid of as many of our Shibboleths as possible; and would suggest that exact uniformity does not exist among us now, and need not be looked upon as indispensable in a reformed system. At all events 'liberavi animam meam'.

APPENDIX.

AN article which has just appeared in the Academy of Feb. 15 by Mr Max Müller, 'on the pronunciation of *c* before *e*, *i*, *y*, *ae*, *eu*, *oe*', and is argued out with his usual power, will help no doubt to make innovation more difficult here. His chief objection to change would seem to be the same as that urged in the Oxford circular, that it could not 'be attempted without intolerable offence to the ears of all the Latin-reading nations'. He speaks of 'fear of ridicule', 'a dislike of the harsh and disagreeable sound of such words as *Kikero*, *fukit*'. This difficulty has never struck me as of such very great weight; and my ear has already accustomed itself to look on *Kikero*, *skelus*, *skio* and the like as even more euphonious than their former sounds. Of course I assume that *Sisero*, *Sesar*, *Sephalus*, *sinic* and the like are still to be English for the new *Kikero*, *Kaesar*, *kynicus*, just as much as for *Κικέρων*, *Καῖσαρ*, *Κέφαλος*, *κυνικός*. Our present English pronunciation of Latin appears to afford some arguments to the point. Some centuries ago we pronounced with the rest of Europe (I assume now the new and corrected sound of the vowels) *cana*, *cara* and the like, as *kana*, *kara*: when the revolution took place in our vowel sounds, we said *kena*, *kera*, not *sena*, *sera*. Now that we propose to reform our vowel sounds in *cena*, *cera*, why should we find *kena*, *kera* more offensive than *sena*, *sera*? Our English *k* is common before all vowels alike and such consonants as it can precede in Latin, and is at least as euphonious as *s* or *tch*: *kettle* and *kin* are not less mellifluous than *settle* and *sin*: *Kikero* I prefer to *Tchitchero*; and I doubt whether *Kikero* is to an Italian more offensive or strange than *Sisero*, as they too have abundant *k* (*ch*) sounds before *e* and *i*. Assuredly the many Greek words like *Cilicia*, *Cibyra*, *scena*, *cithara*, *Cithaeron* I would rather have with their Greek than their Latin sounds.

Quite the same is my experience with the very numerous cases of *-ci*, *-si*, *-ti* before another vowel: *vicies*, *visio*, *vitium*; *species*, *spatium*, *ratio*, *gratia*, *solacium*. Habit here too is all-powerful, whichever direction it takes. The common English pronunciation of Greek words like *Αυσίας* is I believe *Aushias*, *Πελοποννησιοι*, *Μελησιοι* and the like, though custom seems to permit a more correct sounding of the *σ*. The pronunciation of the oldest Greek scholars within my recollection, such as the late Bishop Butler and Mr George Burgess, proved that some generations ago Greek

was in many points sounded more like Latin than it is now. Bishop Blomfield was fond of telling an anecdote about a Freshman examined by Porson. The Freshman talked of βέλshϊον: Porson intimated a preference for βέλ-τιον. The Freshman politely allowed the Professor to please himself; but had all his life been accustomed to *belshion* and intended to stick to it. I think it not very unlikely that before his degree he became reconciled to βέλτιον, and that if the will were present, it would take us less time to exchange *rayshio* for *ratio*, *speeshies* for *spekies*.

Nay if we keep within the limits of the Oxford paper, we shall be forced to many awkward inconsistencies. Suppose we are comparing the successive forms of words which we see collected in the first volume of the new Corpus Inscript, such as *coira*, *coera*, *cura*; *Cailius* and *Caelius*; *Coilius* and *Coelius*, *Caicilius* and *Caecilius*, we must pronounce *Koira*, *sera*, *kura*; *Kailius* and *Selius*; *Koilius* and *Selius*; *Kaisilius* and *Sesilius*. The more ancient *pulcer* and *Gracci* will be *pulser* and *Graksi*, the more recent *pulcher* and *Gracchi* will be *pulker* and *Grakki*: *coëpi* and *coepi* will be *koëpi* and *sepi*. And so with an indefinite number of terminations: *baca* and *bacae* will be *baka* and *basae*; *siccus* and *sicci* will be *sikkus* and *siksi*. Long-suffering as we are on such points with our present system, a partially improved method would perhaps render them intolerable. The Italian shuns such inconsistencies by substituting *ch* (= *k*) for *c*: *secco*, *secchi*, and *lungo*, *lunghe*.

It is doubtful whether our improved *y* sound of *j* will not by contrast make such inconsistencies appear even more flagrant. Habit lets us acquiesce in our English way of pronouncing such words as *ioci*, *iugi*, *coniugibus* and the like: but will not *yosi*, *yuji*; *conyujibus* be somewhat uncouth? The Italians practically reverse this process, and give our *j* sound to the consonantal *i* and our *k* and hard *g* sound to the *c* and *g*, by writing *giuochi*, *gioghi*. This *gi* in fact is the almost universal substitute for the Latin *j*, *aiutare* (*adiutare*) being quite exceptional.

But though to my present feeling to reform the pronunciation of *j* for instance and leave that of *c* unchanged would almost be worse than to do nothing, the important point is to know what is right or probably right. However firmly one may have held the common belief that the sound of the Latin *c* was in all cases the same as *κ* or our *k*, the fact of such an authority as Mr Max Müller calling it in question, must make one hesitate. Still a variety of considerations compels me to retain my former belief.

He points out with much force that it does not follow, because Greeks and others in transferring Latin words into their own language always represented *c* by *k*, that therefore the sound of the two letters was always identical. And yet the fact that Greek and barbarian, Goth and German

alike, do reproduce the Latin *c* by *k* is such a *prima facie* argument of identity or near resemblance, that strong counter evidence is needed to rebut it. Hahn's Grammar and Dictionary shew that the Albanian has sounds representing most of the modern corruptions of the Latin *c*, such as various *σ* and *ζ* sounds. The *cicer*, which must have been imported into those countries in early times, perhaps by Atticus on his farm at Buthrotum, is represented by *κυικερε*: this *y* (or German *j*) sound being exceedingly common in Albanian before all vowels, *a* and *o* as well as *ε* and *ι*. Now when I think of the Greek *Κικέρων* and then of his own eponymous *cicer* reproduced on one side by the Albanian *κυικερε* and on the other by the German *kicher*, each of these languages shewing only the first and to them most natural deviation from the pure *k* sound, the concentrated force of the three impresses me strongly¹.

For the Greeks, though indeed they did represent *f* by *φ*, took much pains to reproduce the most peculiar Latin sounds. How trying must it have been to the eyes and ears of a Greek—unless he wished to laugh at the barbarians—to find in his Polybius Ποστούμιος Ῥήγουλος (Postūmius Regūlus), in his Cassius Dion Οὐλουτόρνου (Vulturū), in his Dionysius Οὐολούσκιος (Volscius), in his Ptolemy Οὐρουεδρούμ, and the like. If the Latin *-ce* and *-ci* had anything of an *s* sound, why could not the Greeks represent them by some combination of *ξ* or *ζ* or *σ*, such as were used in Byzantine times? The Greeks would probably have given to these sounds some conventional meaning, as to those odd accumulations of *ov*: nor do I think they would have cared for the quantity of such barbarous words; or, if they had cared for it, would have hesitated to change it. Indeed any consideration of quantity seems to me to apply with tenfold force to the supposition of an *s* added to the *k* sound in Latin, so long as quantity was regarded, or to the Italian *sch*, which surely must have been anterior to the English or French *s* sound.

Yet more weighty to my mind is the fact that the Romans in all cases expressed *κ* by *c*. In old times they could only reproduce Greek words in the rudest way; but for several generations this nation of philologers expended vast energy in overcoming this difficulty. For this purpose they introduced no less than five 'diacritical' letters or combinations of letters,

¹ It strikes me as improbable that Ulfilas, after years of intercourse with Roman dignitaries in Constantinople during its early days, and living with his flock in the midst of Latin-speaking nations, should have his got Latin words through any 'Greek transliteration'; and, as to the form *aiuaggeli*, surely although in modern Greek *γγ* and in Italian *ng* are alike sounded as *ng*, the very fact that the Greeks put *γ* for *v* and that some of the best Roman Grammarians wished to write in Latin *aggulus*, *aggens*, *iggerunt*, and the like, prove that it was different in ancient times.

y, z, ch, ph, th, in order to reproduce with the nicest accuracy every Greek sound; and schooled their tongue to utter words which once were most strange to them. At first content with *Tésés*, they finally brought themselves to adopt *Theseús*, a sound and intonation most alien to a Roman ear. Long satisfied with *Saguntum*, with *sepurus* or *sepirus*, *lucinus* or *licinus*, they came at last to *Zacynthus*, *zephyrus*, *lychnus*, containing each of them three letters or combinations of letters utterly foreign to them. So that at length they learnt to revel in such sweet sounds as *Antheús*, and *Mnestheús*, and *Actíds Oreíthya*.

Why then, when they had got to *Cepheús*, *Cephalus*, *Chalcis*, *cithara* and the like, if *c* was not exactly equivalent to *k*, did they not adopt here too a 'diacritical' letter? One was at hand, more ready for use than any of the five adopted, their own *k*, now lying idle, with only an antiquarian value before *a* in a few words or symbols of words. And on this point the *dekembres* of no. 844 of the *Corpus inscr.* vol. 1 seems to have some bearing. This is one of nearly 200 short, plebeian, often half-barbarous very old inscriptions on a collection of ollae. The *k* before *e* or any letter except *a* is solecistic, just as in no. 831 is the *c*. instead of *k*. for *calendas*. From this I would infer that, as in the latter the writers saw no difference between *c* and *k*, so to the writer of the former *k* was the same as *c* before *e*. Perhaps *keri* tells the same tale, if, as Mommsen assumes, it be the genitive of *cerus* (*creator*).

The following too appears to me to have no small significance. In Cicero's time from an abuse of Greek fashions the aspirate was permanently attached to a few Latin words. Cicero tells us (*Orator* § 160) that till late in life he had persisted in saying *pulcros*, *Cetegos*, *triumpos*, *Cartaginem*; but after a hard struggle evil habit and public opinion forced him to insert the *h* in these words. It appears now from inscriptions and Quintilian (I, 5, 20) that this *h*, which in some words was permanent, in others not, was attached to *c* alike before *a*, *o*, *u* and *e*, *i*: in the 1st vol. of the *Corpus inscr.* we find *Volchacia* and *Achilio* (*Acilio*); often *Pulcher*, but also *Pulcer*. We have *Gracchus* and *Graccus*, *Gracchis* and *Graccis*: Quintilian refers to what he calls Catullus' 'nobile epigramma' *Chommoda dicebat*, and says that some inscriptions still extant have *choronas chenturiones praechones*. It is I believe generally allowed that the ancient sound of *θ*, *φ*, *χ* was that of the *tenuis* with a distinct *h* sound attached to it. But even conceding that *ch* was like the modern Greek or Scotch or German guttural, in either case I do not well see how the aspirate could have been attached to the *c*, if *c* had not a *k* sound, or how in this case *c* before *e* or *i* could have differed from *c* before *a*, *o*, *u*.

And finally, what is to me most convincing of all, I do not well under-

stand how in a people of Grammarians, where for 700 years from Ennius to Priscian the most distinguished writers were also the most minute philologists, not one, so far as we know, should have hinted at any difference, if such existed: neither Ennius, Accius or Lucilius, the three greatest of the early poets; nor Cicero, Varro or Cæsar; nor Pliny or Quintilian, nor Gellius, Charisius, Donatus, Servius or Priscian. Lucilius devoted whole books to such slight matters as the use of *fervit* or *fervet*; *i* or *ei* in terminations. Cicero in his Orator and elsewhere dwells on what seem to us very trivial minutiae. Varro asserted that *lact* was right, *lac* wrong; Cæsar in his 'de analogia', addressed to Cicero, maintained that Varro and *lact* were both wrong, *lac* alone right. He told Cicero that the genitive of their common friend Pompeiius' name ought to have three *i*'s and explained how they were to be pronounced; but seems to have said nothing of the *c*'s in *Cicero*. Quintilian tells us how to pronounce the *i* of *optimus*, the final *e* of *here*, and much else of an equally important nature. And all know that Gellius, Servius, Priscian and the rest are brimful from first to last of the most insignificant details: but of a soft *c* not one syllable.

Nay, what is even more to the point, Priscian relates at length how Pliny heard three different sounds of *l*: an 'exilis sonus' as in *ille*: a 'plenus' as in *sol*: a 'medius' as in *lectus*. So Priscian himself finds the *n* of *nomen* to be 'plenior', that of *annis* to be 'exilior'; and not only is there a difference in final *m*, but the *m* of *magnus* 'apertum sonat', the *m* of *umbra* 'mediocre'. Of *c* οὐδὲ γρῦ, singular indeed if its sound differed perceptibly before different letters; for surely the distinctions in the letters just enumerated cannot have been so very great.

Quite as little classical authority can I find for our strange confusion of sounds in many classes of words, important from their great number, as they happen to occur in so many common inflexions: I speak of *ce*, *ci*, *se*, *si*, *ti*, coming before another vowel, to all of which we give the same Hebraic βέλshior sound: *iaceam*, *placeo*, *iacies*, *faciunt*, *condicio*; *nausea*, *caesius*, *divisio*; *ratio*, *gratia*, *retia*, *otium*, *indutiae*, etc. etc. The modern confusion of sounds here comes I believe not from classical times, but from the 'colluvies gentium' which met together on the breaking up of the old world. Mr Müller says Corssen has 'proved (p. 54) that from about 200 A.D. words with *ti* began to be spelt with *ci*. How was that possible? if *ci* was always pronounced *ki*, then assimilated *ti* could never have been written *ci*.' The 'never' is surely too much: Ribbeck in his prolegomena to Virgil, p. 241, gives dozens of instances where one or other of his capital Mss. writes *c* for *t* or *t* for *c*; such as *ac* for *at*, *tetera* for *cetera*, *tumulos* for *cumulos*, *etquis* for *ecquis*, in none of which can the two letters have had the least similarity of sound. But he gives not a single instance of

confusion in a capital Ms. between the *ci* and *ti* in question: these Mss. write without fail *dicio*, *solacia*, *facies*, *proditio*, *seditio*, *ratio*, *spatium*. And yet almost every line of Latin offers opportunities for blundering on this point. When we consider this, the half-dozen instances in Corsen seem quite inadequate to prove confusion between *ci* and *ti*. For there are but six which have even a *prima facie* look of sufficiency: the most promising of these is *renunciacionem* from a Roman inscription of A.D. 211. But when we examine its pedigree, we find that Orelli copies it from Reinesius' collection 'quibus nihil imperfectius vitiosiusque extet,' says Iac. Gronovius: 'ipse lapides nullos viderat,' says another scholar: 'who exceeds all bounds in saxa violentius grassando,' says a third. When we remember then that in Reinesius' time *renunciatio* was the recognised spelling, that one instance after another of *conditio* for example vanishes when it can be put to the test, surely the chances are a hundred to one that the *c* is due to Reinesius or some previous transcriber, not to the old Roman chiseller. Two more of unknown age are due to old copies taken when *ocio* at least was a received spelling: two more are published by Renier from a copy taken by a French officer at Medjana in Africa, Africa great mother of barbarisms and heresies. The 6th has an unquestionable voucher: Mommsen's inscr. reg. Neap. 109 has *disposicionem*. It was copied at Salerno; but it must be late and is very barbarous, containing also *rivocaverit*, *distituta*, *populusquae*, an unmeaning *suetad*, the language being in part unintelligible. Had Corsen applied his vast industry to post-classical times, he might have collected without effort 100,000 clear instances of the confusion in question, the only reason with many apparently for writing *racio*, *spacium*, *faties*, *speties* being that the spelling was wrong. We still see some relics of this barbarism of the middle ages in *conditio*, *solatium*, *novitius*, *tribunitius*, *nuncius*, and the like¹.

We have however late classical authority of the 5th century for a corruption of *ti* (not *ci*): Servius tells us that *medius* was pronounced *medsius*, something like the Italian *mezzo*: Pompeius, probably of the same age, informs us that it is a fault to say *Titius*, not *Titsius*. If therefore we prefer the 5th century to the age of Cicero and Quintilian, we should say, not *Tishius*, *Horashius*, but *Titzius*, *Horatzius*: but then to be consistent we should also say *medzius*, *commodzius*. From the strange emphasis with which Pompeius asserts that *Titsius* is right, *Titius* wrong, I should infer

¹ The supposed *concupiscencie* for *concupiscentiae* in an acrostich of the African Commodian, a comparatively early, but very barbarous writer, vanishes, when it is seen that the sense and context require *Tum* (or, *Tu*) *vigila* for *Cum vigilas*. This correction which I made myself many years ago, has been made by Haupt in a recent number of the *Hermes*.

that this was a new fashion; and that *laiktio* represented to Ulfilas the sound of *lectio* in his day, while *karutsjo* gave the sound of *cautio* in the year 551. In Servius' time the natural feeling for quantity was utterly gone: it had to be learnt as artificially as it is learnt now. But in earlier classical times such pronunciations were out of the question. Indeed if we are to observe quantity, which many of us think a vital part of reform, I hardly know how with any of the modern fashions of pronouncing we are properly to enunciate *rätio* and *Horätius*, *fäcies* and *soläcium*.

TRINITY COLLEGE: *February* 1871.

POSTSCRIPT.

THE preceding Remarks were privately circulated some months ago among the masters of schools, the members of the Universities and others who I thought had a right to be consulted, or might feel an interest in the points discussed. I now publish them with the present supplement for more reasons than one. During the months of February, March, April, May and June of this year several questions concerning pronunciation were argued at length in the pages of the Academy, by myself and others. Again our distinguished scholar and historian, the Dean of Ely, wrote a paper in the Contemporary for April on 'the classical pronunciation of Latin'. Mr Roby too has recently published his Latin Grammar in which the sounds of the language have been treated of very fully and very ably. In most points I am happy to say we are entirely agreed: on the few in which we differ I will take this opportunity of saying something. Whether the headmasters of schools have acted wisely in raising the question of pronunciation at all, I am unable to decide. As I said in the Academy, it may be better to do nothing: the spectre of Greek is ever before my eyes. It seems unreasonable to reform our Latin pronunciation and leave our Greek unchanged. And I for one know not what to do with the latter and its avenging accent. If however we are to change, I am for as complete a change as possible. In this I am glad to have the support not only of Mr Roby but of Mr J. Rhys in his very valuable letter, printed in the Academy of May 1, in which he shews what may be gained for Latin pronunciation from the Welsh. 'In the Oxford circular' he says 'it is proposed to make only a minimum of change in the present pronunciation of the Latin vowels. This seems to be treating the present fashion with too much tenderness: if indeed a change be desirable, let it be an adequate one'. Few of the headmasters and others to whom I sent my Re-

marks, have told me what their views and wishes are. Yet most of those from whom I have heard appear to be in favour of a complete change. Mr Grignon of Felstead for example tells me that he and his boys alike find a complete more easy and agreeable than a partial change; and Mr Farrar of Marlborough does not think it more difficult. Let us try our utmost, we shall at best be far enough from perfection.

One of the questions discussed at greatest length in the Academy was whether consonant *u* was to be sounded like English *w* or English *v*. The sole champion of the *v* was Prof. Robinson Ellis, who argued the point at great length and with a zeal which far outstripped his discretion. So far as I, or any one else whom I have consulted, can see, his premisses had little or no bearing on the real questions at issue, and his conclusions as little concern with his premisses. Thus when I had quoted Gellius in p. 9 of my Remarks to shew that Cicero's friend Nigidius Figulus pronounced *vos* as *woōs*, he retorts upon me that the passage on the contrary is in favour of a *v* sound, and clinches his retort by the dictum of a later grammarian 'V ore constricto labrisque prominulis exhibetur'. The grammarian is really telling us by what position of the mouth and lips we are to pronounce the vowel *u*: if Mr Ellis does not feel the humour of this, then surely his sense of the ludicrous is undeveloped. I regret to speak thus of a learned brother Professor; but clearly this is a case of ἀμφοῖν ὄντοι φῖλοι κ.τ.λ. and Mr Ellis ought in charity to remember the thankless labour he has imposed on me and others. Let me again refer to the elaborate exposition of this question by Mr Roby in p. xxxii—xlii of his grammar; and quote from the Academy some words of my own: I cannot help inferring from the hideously barbarous forms in which the older Greek writers express Latin words, that *ou* came near to the sound of consonant *u* and that Cassius Dion for instance could precisely reproduce *aduentus* only by ἀδουέντος: that β on the other hand was a substitute like the φ for *f*, or the Italian and French *gu* or *g* for the old Teutonic *w*. But even in French we find *ouest* for *west*, and Italian and Spanish *guai*, French *ouais*, whether they come from Latin *vae* or an older form of German *weh*; as well as *guastare* and *gâter*, which they would seem to have caught up from their Teuton masters before the *w* sound of *vastare* had passed into the Romance *v*, all tell the same tale. This is well illustrated by what Mr Rhys tells us in his

most important letter referred to above: Latin words beginning with *v* begin with *gw* in Welsh: *Gwener* = *Vener-is*, *gwenwyn* = *venenum*, *gwain* = *vagina*, *gwawl* = *vallum*. But in words taken from English initial *v* is represented by *b* or *m*: thus we have *mantais*, *menter*, *milain*, *berf*, etc. from *vantage*, *venture*, *millain*, *verb*, etc. Now Welsh is especially valuable here, when we consider the period within which such words must have been borrowed from the Romans. Mr Ellis greatly darkened counsel by his uncritical treatment of the confusion which finally took place in many words between *b* and consonant *u*. After exposing this at length I thus summed up: neither the old Greeks nor Romans, I believe, had our and the Romance *v* sound: *b* and consonant *u* were kept quite distinct in the best classical period. Perhaps towards the end of the second century, when many other symptoms of decay began to shew themselves in the language, a lazy confusion of the two crept into the utterance of many words. But *amavi* was pronounced *amai* before the *v* got its present Italian sound, which was not fully developed till post-classical times. We shall thus I think best account for Italian *amai* = *amavi*, as well as *amavo* = *amabam*; for *ho hai ha ebbi* = *habeo habes habet habui*, as well as *avevo* = *habebam*, etc. The early corruptions of *laborai* and the like for *laboravi*, etc. seem to postulate a quasi *w* pronunciation of consonant *u*.

I will now refer to the few points in which there is a serious difference of opinion between Mr Roby and myself. He has become somewhat more favourable to Italian; we are agreed now about *ē* and *ō*; but differ somewhat as to *ē*, *ae* and *ō*. At present I will only say that I do not know how the facts I have briefly touched upon in page 9, connecting old Latin with modern Italian, can be looked upon as of slight moment in the discussion: surely on such slippery ground one fact is worth a hundred theoretical considerations. Every day I feel more and more certain that no consistent reform can be carried out, unless we look up to the Italian vowel system as an ideal to be aimed at, if it cannot be always attained. As I said in the Academy, if any change is made, be it great or small, I am convinced that the mainstay of an efficient reform is the adoption essentially of the Italian vowel system: it combines beauty, firmness and precision in a degree not equalled by any other system of which I have any knowledge. The little ragged boys in the streets of Rome and Florence enunciate their vowels in a style of which princes

might be proud. Next to the Italian I would acquiesce in the German vowel system. The Scotch is to me disagreeable, the French almost ludicrous. Mr Roby asserts that 'the Italian has sprung not from the cultivated language, but from one or more rustic provincial dialects', that 'Italian is not the child of classical Latin, but of one or more unsubdued dialects'. I on the other hand, hold it to be demonstrable that the Romano-Tuscan is the child of *cultivated* Latin, falling to pieces, and caught up and *subdued* by German mouths. With reference to the Latin *ɛ* and *ɔ* as represented by Italian close *e* and *o*, to which Mr Roby applies this theory of dialects, I would call attention to an interesting article which has just appeared in the *Hermes*, on Roman names in Greek inscriptions and literature. It is there shewn that the oldest inscriptions and writers continually represent Latin *ɛ* by *ε*, that for instance the name Tiberius is habitually reproduced by *Τεβέριος*, until Tiberius' accession to the empire officially decided its spelling in Greek. This will explain the connexion of *Tevere*, *fede* and the like with *Tiberis*, *fides* etc. far more simply than 'one or more rustic dialects'.

To come to *s*: Mr Roby and I differ with regard to the comparatively few cases in which *s*, not representing a real *ss*, comes between two vowels. But here too I would appeal to the interesting analogies in Italian to which I refer in p. 13. The Italian too is strongly supported by late Greek: we find *κασσος* (*casus*), *κουρισσος* (*curiosus*), *φαμωσσα* (*famosa*), *ἐξκουσσατος* (*excusatus*), *ἐξκουσσατεναι* (*excusare*) and the like. What is the meaning of this *σσ*, if there was no difference between the *s* of *casus* (*cassus*) and *cāsa*, of *rōsus* (*rossus*) and *rōsa*? I quite agree with Mr Roby that in the case of *ns* which always made the preceding vowel long, the *n* was almost or quite mute and the *s* sharp: comp. *ης* = *ens*, *totiēs* = *totiens*: Varro and Pliny tell us through Charisius that *frons* = *fros*, *fruns* = *frus*: *formōnsus* too = *formōssus* = *formōsus*, all three being pronounced alike. The case is much the same with *prōrsum* *prōssum* *prōsum*, *rūrsum* *rūssum* *rūsum*, and similar forms.

Only one other point have I to contest with Mr Roby, one which however I did not expect to have to contest. In p. LXXIII he writes 'Mr Munro takes Priscian's statement (II 63) that the vowel before *gn* was always long, as meaning that the *gn* makes it long by nature'. But I would ask how I could possibly take his statement as meaning anything else, when after an elaborate explanation of the long vowel

of adjectives of places in *-inus* and *-ānus*, he thus continues: *gnus quoque vel gna vel gnum terminantia longam habent vocalem paenultimam, ut rēgnum stāgnum benīgnum malignus abiēgnus privīgnum Paelīgnum*. Priscian distinguished most carefully vowels long by nature, and short vowels which had position: thus elsewhere he draws conclusions from the short *i* of *firmus*, *virgo* and *vix*. Mr Roby and I are I believe pretty well agreed as to the general merits of Priscian; that for his age he was a very learned man; but that age was the 6th century. Of necessity therefore he was wholly dependent on older authorities for all that he tells us worth knowing, and when he trusts to himself, he falls into imbecility. It is absolutely certain then that the passage in question comes directly or indirectly from some old and good authority; since we can see from the loose gossip of Gellius that even in his day the most learned men were losing the instinctive feeling for the natural length of vowels which had position; certain I repeat that it is servilely copied in fact from some one like Varro, or Verrius Flaccus, or Valerius Probus, one who had the same indisputable right to speak on such points, as Cicero has when he tells us that the *in* of *insanus* and *infimus* is long, of *inclitus* short by nature. Surely without Cicero this would seem at least as improbable, as that the vowel before *gn* is long by nature in *ignarus*, *cognitus*, etc.

How could Priscian of himself know anything of what he here tells us? But Mr Roby says he cannot agree with me and thinks Priscian unsupported in his statement: 'Priscian on his principles could come to no other conclusion; for he held that *gn* began the final syllable and that *gn* made a preceding syllable common, i.e. allowed a short vowel to remain short (I 11, II 10).' Hence finding all words which ended in *gnus* had the penultimate long, he concluded the vowel must be long'. And surely in all this Priscian is quite right, and his statement may be supported by a variety of arguments: *gn* did allow in Latin a short vowel to remain short before it, and yet in every Latin word the vowel is inflexibly long by nature: *sī-gnum*, *tī-gnum*, *ī-gnotus*, *cō-gnatus*, etc. etc. the *g* and *n* being locked in one another, and the vowel rendered long by nature; just as in the very similar instance of *ns* we find *totiēs* = *totiens*, Κλήμης = *Clemens*, and again and again in old Latin *cōsol*, *cēsor*, *cōsentiont*, *cōstanti* and the like; while before all other consonants except *gn* and *ns* the *cōn* or *cōm* remains short by nature and does

not lose its consonant: thus we have *congregior*, *conglutino* (as well as *ingredior*, *ingluvies* and the like), never *cogredior*, etc.; while with *gn* not only do we find *cō-gnitus*, *co-gnatus*, as well as *i-gnotus* etc., but the *g* too is absorbed and disappears in *cō-nexus*, *cō-nitor*, *cō-nubium*, *cō-niveo*, the double *n* in all these words being a gross and admitted solecism. The *cōn* remains short I repeat before all other consonants; for not only have we *cō* before vowels, but Consentius tells us (p. 400 Keil) the curious fact that Lucilius, dropping *per metaplasmum* one *r*, says *ore cōrupto*. And, though formerly I was biassed by the authority of Lachmann, I now feel no doubt that his MSS. are quite right in giving to Lucretius (VI 1135) *natura cōruptum*.

Why I dwelt on this point in my paper was mainly in consequence of Corssen's note (II p. 265) where he assails Hermann and Ritschl's irrefragable dictum that the old scenic poets never allow a mute and liquid to give position to a short vowel: they always have *nīgri*, *lābrum* and the like, while the hexameter poets much prefer to lengthen these syllables when the mute is a medial. He quotes a great number of these words in which he says a short vowel is lengthened by Plautus and Terence before *gn*. And indeed, just as the vowel should be short in *insanus*, *consul*, *sapiens* and the like, but for this peculiar power of *ns*; so should it be short in *ignarus*, *ignotus* etc. but for this cognate power of *gn*: also in *signum*, *tignum* etc. as shewn by *sigillum*, *tigillum* etc. In adopting the Greek *κύκνος*, *Πρόκνη* Plautus could not say either *cūgnus* or *cūgnus*, *Prōgne* or *Prōgne*: he wrote *cūcīnus* and *Prōcīna*. The short vowel followed by the two distinct consonants were an impossibility to his and his hearers' ears: in *Latin* words he and they knew only *sī-gnum*, *tī-gnum*, *cō-gnatus*, etc. Yet at the same time, though he knew only *lābra*, *pīgri*, while Horace and Ovid preferred *lābra* and *pīgri*, Horace can write *Donatura cūgni*, Ovid *Ad mandata Prōgnes*, proving surely thereby the statement of Priscian; for their MSS. give *gn* and not *cn*, and even if we assume that they wrote *cn*, *gn* was always the prevailing spelling and therefore pronunciation. And why does Mr. Roby overlook the fact I stated that in inscriptions of high authority, not likely to err on such points, we find *sIgna*, *dIgna*, the long *i* implying that the vowels are long by nature? we find too *regnī* and *regno* with the apex, and Corssen says the root-vowel is short, though he may be wrong in this. Ptolemy gives

the name of *Ῥῆγνοι* to a people in Britain, *Κῶγνοι* to a people of Germany, in both cases doubtless getting the names from Roman sources, while two cities in India he names *Κογναβάνδα* and *Κογνάνδα*, and, but for Latin influence, the short vowel would seem most natural judging by all analogy. But 'the Latin words *Egnatia*, *Egnatius* occur not unfrequently in Greek with *ε*'. The words are no more Latin than *Diognetus*, *Poljgnotus*, *Prögne*, *cjgnus*: the town is Pencetian, akin to Greeks, not Latins; and Mommsen tells us that the native name is *Gnathia*, the genuine Latin form *Gnatia*; and certainly our two oldest authorities Horace and Mela know no other form. If it be affirmed that *Gnatia* is *Egnatia* with the *e* dropped, that would only strengthen my position. The Egnatii were no Latins: until after the social war they were always bitter enemies of Rome. I still therefore adhere to Priscian and to my opinion: and have no doubt that what has been said of *gn* applies to *gm* as well: *ägmen*, *tägmen*, etc. I have much difficulty in perceiving what Mr Roby gains for his argument by the fact that the Verona palimpsest of Livy (or any other manuscript) 'always divides words with *gn* occurring at the end of a line between the *g* and *n*, so as to give the *g* and *n* to separate syllables': the 'always' is self-refuting, and proves, as Mommsen himself to whom he refers justly says, that 'veriloquii in talibus nullam omnino rationem haberi'. Mr Roby I feel sure will not maintain that *ig* | *nominia* and *ig* | *nota* are rightly divided; or that *i-gnominia* and *i-gnota* are not unquestionably true: I should say the same of *benig* | *nitatem*: *beni-gnitatem* can alone be correct: *ne* | *glegens* is equally absurd in the other direction.

The curious Latin Christmas chant which Constantine Porphyrogenitus has preserved for us, written in Greek characters for Greek tongues, and handed down traditionally for generations, lets us see that many corruptions had long existed in the pronunciation of both languages, while *c* had continued hard. One of the verses is as follows: *κουμ κρουκηφίξους έστ έτ σεπούλτους έν τερζία διερρεσουρέξειτ*, i.e. cum crucifixus est et sepultus, in tertia die resurrexit: here we see that *η* = *ι*, as in modern Greek; and *τι* = *ζι*, as illustrated above in p. 21 at the end of my Remarks; but the *c* of *crucifixus* is still hard. As then Professor Palmer in the Academy of March 15 informs us that the majority of the Oxford Philological Society have now decided that *c*, *g* and *t* should be sounded hard before all vowels alike, I should have concluded that enough and more than

enough had already been said on this head, if it had not been for the Dean of Ely's article in the *Contemporary Review* for April, which after a few general remarks is wholly devoted to the much vexed Latin *c*. The opinions of so eminent a scholar cannot be slighted: I shall therefore repeat here the greater part of a letter of mine which appeared in the *Academy* of May 1: it will serve as a supplement to the Appendix to my *Remarks*.

Let me begin by stating that the 'one or more persons of impulsive temperament' include among others the Philological Society of Oxford and the headmasters of the forty or fifty greatest schools in England. Possibly enough, as I have always asserted, it may not be worth our while to attempt to recover the utterance and intonation of a dead language; but, as I have tried to show in my printed remarks, we have greater facilities in my judgment for approximating to the pronunciation of old Latin than Dr Merivale believes to exist. We know exactly how Cicero or Quintilian did or could spell; we know the syllable on which they placed the accent of almost every word; and in almost every case we already follow them in this. I have the conviction that in their best days that philological people took vast pains to make the writing exactly reproduce the sounding; and that if Quintilian or Tacitus spelt a word differently from Cicero or Livy, he also spoke it so far differently. With the same amount of evidence, direct and indirect, we have for Latin, it would not I think be worth anybody's while to try to recover the pronunciation of French or English; it might I think be worth his while to try to recover that of German or Italian, in which sound and spelling accord more nearly and accent obeys more determinable laws.

But on these general questions nobody will care for what his neighbour says or thinks. I proceed therefore to the special topic of Dr Merivale's paper, the pronunciation of the Latin *c*, of which he wishes 'to say a few words before the hour has struck for fixing it irrevocably'. And here I would remark that he appears to me to be too hard on Madvig and 'his followers', whose theory as to the sound of *c* does not depart more widely from our or the Italian practice than does Dr Merivale's own; for he is the only scholar of distinction

I ever heard of who has maintained that the old Greeks sounded *ἄντλος* as *anshlos*, or that the old Latins pronounced *exanclare* as *exanshlare*, *porta* and *porca* as *porsha*. Dr Merivale puts poor *Cicero* once again to the question. He not only says what is true enough, that the hardness of the Greek does not prove that of the Latin *c*; but he is not sure that the *κ* was hard. I showed however in the appendix to my Remarks that *cicer* was reproduced in Albanian by *κυικυερε*, in German by *kicher*, which allows I think of a more conclusive inference. This inference I will try to strengthen here. Mr Rhys in the instructive letter spoken of above tells us that in Welsh *c* and *g* are always hard, whatever vowel may or once did immediately follow them. He gives this list of words taken from the Latin, where *c* precedes *e* or *i*: *cella* = *cell*, *cera* = *cwyr*, *certare* = *certhain*, *cingula* = *cengl*, *cista* = *cist* and *cest*, *cicuta* = *cegid*, *civitas* = *ciwed*, *civitat-is* = *ciwdod*, *cippus* = *cyff*, plur. *cyffion*. In 'inlaut' Latin *c* regularly becomes *g* in Welsh: *cancelli* = *cangell*, *ascendere* = *esgyn*, *descendere* = *disgyn*, *deficere* = *diffyg*, *locellus* = *llogell*, *maceria* = *magwyr*, *medicina* = *meddyginiaeth*, *pascere* = *pesgi*, *praeceptum* = *pregeth*. 'Welsh words give no evidence of a hesitation between *ci* and *ti*, thus *natalicia* is postulated by *nadolig*'. 'It would be useless to multiply instances, as there are no exceptions tending to prove the Latin *c* to have been pronounced soft before *i* or *e*, excepting a few of modern date. The same argument may be extensively supported by instances from the other Celtic languages'.

Mr G. W. Mason too of Morton Hall has sent me a list of Welsh words derived directly from the Latin; among them *ceirios* = *cerasus*, *carchar* = *carcer*. No one I think will doubt that these words were taken directly from the living Latin, as the Latin words were from the living Greek. Equally certain it is that Gothic *karkara* and German *kerker* came directly from the living Latin, and *kirsche* too directly or indirectly. Thus then the old Siceliot and Italiot *κάρκαρος* (*κάρκαρον*), *carcer*, *carchar*, *karkara*, *kerker*, were all five sounded hard; or else a soft Latin *c* reproduced the hard Greek *κ*, while all the three languages which took the word directly from the Latin agreed in returning to the hard *k* sound, though they all might have used sibilants to express it. Which hypothesis is the more likely? The argument is not affected if, as Dr Merivale would deem possible, *κάρκαρος* was pronounced *sarsaros*: *κέρασος*, *cerasus*, *ceirios*, *kirsche*, tell the same tale: *κίστη* of Homer is in Latin *cista*: this same

word, borrowed from Latin, reappears with hard *c* or *k* in Welsh and other Celtic languages, in old German and new German, in Scotch, Dutch, Icelandic, Swedish and Danish, under one or other of these forms, *cist*, *cest*, *cisde*, *ciste*, *kest*, *kista*, *kiste*, *kist*: compare too *Caesar*, *Kaïōap*, and Gothic, German and English, *keisar*, *kaiser*, *kesar*, etc. And yet, as Corssen shews, when the Germans borrowed words after the Romance sounds were introduced, they employed a sibilant: *zelle*, *zirkel*, *zither*.

Dr Merivale casually opens his Propertius and finds that the MSS. give *cilices* for *silices*: the MSS. of Propertius are of the late middle ages, and from those times 10,000 similar instances can be got. The same may be said of the *arscedat* of Turpilium, where the true reading is by no means so certain as Dr Merivale seems to think it: the best MSS. of Nonius, from whom the passage comes, belong to the earlier middle ages. Such blunders being past numbering in post-classical times, unless it can be shewn that they were usual in classical times, my inference would be the exact contrary of Dr Merivale's. And so with the 'fluctuation so common in our printed books and MSS. of *ci* and *ti* pure', unless it can be shewn that such fluctuation took place in classical times; and I flatter myself I can shew it did not. And here let me express my absolute conviction that with regard to the words he specifies every scholar whose judgment is held to be supreme on such points, such as Ritschl, Mommsen, Huebner, Haupt, will at once declare that the sole classical forms are *condicio*, *contio*, *nuntius*, *novicius*: reason, authority and etymology are here at one. *Accius* and *Attius*, *Mucius* and *Mutius*, may all exist, but the different forms point to different origins. *Portia* I know in Shakespeare, but only *Porcius* and *Porcia* have classical authority; and so with *Aebutius*, *Caedicius*, *Sulpicius*, *Itius*. 'It is clear that both writers and printers gave a common pronunciation to *ci* and *ti* pure'. Yes; but what writer or printer before the 7th century?

Dr Merivale asks, 'Is not *porca* = *porta*, the gateway or space between two furrows? Again, is not *porca* = *πόρπις*, the pregnant sow or heifer?' *porcus* then will be the pregnant boar. 'Is not *Mars* identical with *Marcus*, and accordingly *Martius* = *Marcus*?' So we are to pronounce, it seems, *Marsh* *Marshis* *Marshius*, *porsha* *porshis*. 'I surmise, with some confidence, that if one transcriber wrote *exanflare* and another *exanclare*, it was because the word was pronounced *exanshlare*. And this too represented the Greek *ἀντλος* (*anshlos*)'.

I have never before known Englishman, German, Frenchman or Italian go such lengths in sibilation as this. For the first *porca* let me refer Dr Merivale to *furrow*, *furche*, and Grimm's law; for the second to *farrow*, *farch*, (*ferkel*, *porcellus*), and the same law. See too Max Müller on the Science of Language, vol. I p. 296 (6th ed.): 'the Latin *porca*, a ridge between two furrows, is derived from *porcus*, hog; and the German *furicha*, furrow, is connected with *farah*, boar'. *Mars Martis Martius* are all in rule: *Marcus*, comparing *Mamercus* and *Tiberius*, I believe to be a child or favourite of Mars; and from *Marcus* comes *Marcus*, as from *Quintus* (*Quinctus*) comes *Quinctius*, from *Sextus* *Sextius*. But what all this has to do with the sound of *c* or *t* I cannot conceive. Ought a foreigner to maintain that the *k* has an *s* sound in *Tompkins* and *Wilkins*, because they are etymologically connected with *Thompson* and *Wilson*? *Exanculare* and *exanclare* (anculo, ancilla) are the sole classical forms: the word has no more concern with ἀντλος than with the German *antlitz*, or English *antler*. The learned Theban who first wrote *exantlo* wished to connect it preposterously with Greek: perhaps it was he who first discovered *coelum sylva hymbres* and similar flowers of etymology. Surely the time is come to discard such fancies.

But Dr Merivale concedes that 'the usage of the 12th or 14th century is not conclusive as to that of any preceding one'; and adds, 'we possess probably no manuscript authority which goes back to the classical or nearly to the classical ages'. Of Virgil alone, or of portions of him, we possess at least six MSS. which go back to late classical times; and every one of them utterly repudiates any such confusion of *c* and *t*—unless, that is, we are to pronounce *ac* and *at* as *ash* on the analogy of *anshlos*; *sic* and *sit* as *sich*; for these little words are occasionally confused.

How can *infitiæ* come from the Homeric ἀμφασίη any more than *fateor* and *confiteor* from φησι? Gellius knew no *secius*: he himself said *sētius*; he or Varro seems to have found *sectius* in a manuscript of Plautus: we are then to pronounce *quinctus* and *quintus* as *quinshus* on the analogy of *anshlos*; *vita* and *victus* as *visha* and *vishus*. Is an extruded *c* before *t* so foreign to Latin? what of *artus fartus sartus*? Of course Varro, like everybody else before A.D. 600 odd, spelt *pretium* with a *t*; but the jingle 'nunc prece, nunc pretio'. I prefer with the sounds not entirely coincident, i.e. either as we or the Italians pronounce it, or as I believe Ovid and Horace pronounced

it, 'nunc preke, nunc pretio'. I am compelled therefore to doubt that it 'was doubly alliterative'. 'Varro' Dr Merivale adds 'has a curious passage on the word *feciales*: quod *fidei* publicae praeerant; nam per hos *fiebat* (i.e. hi *faciebant*) ut justum conciperetur bellum, et...ut *foedere* fides pacis constitueretur: as if to his ear the *d* and *c* in *Fidiales*, *Foediales*, and *Feciales* had much the same sound. Which is the most likely; that it was the sound of *k*, or of *dh*, *th*, or *sh*? Let Dr Merivale rest assured that to Varro, and his countrymen for six centuries after him, *fetiales* was the only known form, *feciales* a nonentity. We have merely therefore to mediate between *t* and *d*, an easy enough feat in the case of Varro's etymologies.

Dr Merivale comes at last 'to the testimony of monumental inscriptions; and about these there can be no misapprehension'. My experience, alas! is widely different. He observes that whoever glances over Orelli's *Corpus Inscriptionum*, will find *conditio* and *condicio*, *statio* and *stacio*, *nuntius* and *nuncius*, *fetialis* and *fecialis*. It is true he will; but let me shortly illustrate this point. Of all these words there is one and only one right spelling—*condicio*, *statio*, *nuntius*, *fetialis*: whenever you find in Orelli the wrong spelling, it is taken from some old collector who took it from some one else, or blindly followed the depraved spelling of his time; and whenever a competent observer can test such spelling, it is found to be a blunder. Thus in no. 4132 Orelli gives *conditione*: Mommsen has copied from the original and published the same inscription, and reads *condicione*: 'utri creditis?' Another inscription Orelli takes from Gruter, Gruter from an old and worthless authority Apianus. Gruter gives this inscription twice over: once he prints *condicione*, three times *conditione*: his authority Apianus once prints *condicione*! All these works I have before me at this moment. Did space and patience allow, all the other false spellings might be routed in the same way: *patritius* is absolutely without authority. It is met with in Orelli, not 'often', but in no. 723: this he takes from Gruter; Gruter, as Orelli remarks, gives this same inscription twice: in the one place he prints *patritios*, in the other *patricios*! Orelli published his collection in 1828, and we are now in the year of grace 1871. 'On the other hand *aedilicius*, *sodalitium* are spelt with *c*: yes, and *c* is alone right, *t* wrong de facto and de iure. One or two of the names mentioned have a double spelling, but also a double etymology; but *Sulpicius*, *Caedicius*, *Aebutius*, are the only true forms. 'The inference seems

irresistible'. What inference? Surely this, that, while an ancient stonecutter could not confound *ci* and *ti* pure because to him the sounds were totally different, a modern transcriber, before the quite recent introduction of a real epigraphical science, could not be trusted not to confound them because the sounds were to him the same. Thus with regard to the just-mentioned *sodalicium* the accurate and accomplished Huebner for his new volume of Spanish inscriptions copies from the original and prints *sodalicium* in no. 3730, while a Spanish scholar in the year 1760 reads *sodalitium*.

I marvel how Dr Merivale could have made all the startling deductions he has made, without reflecting on the countless chances of error from the carelessness or ignorance or prejudice of transcribers of transcribers, printers, correctors, etc.: thus in the supplementary volume to Orelli, published by Henzen, one of the greatest of living epigraphists, I could scarcely believe my eyes when I saw in no. 5438 *tribunitia*. Huebner however informs us that Henzen has written to tell him that this is a mere misprint, the original having of course *tribunicia*.

And now we are advancing to the final and triumphant climax. 'But of all these monuments there is none that comes to us with more authority both from its age and its authorship, than the marmor Ancyranum, the inscription on which is the undoubted composition...of the Emperor Augustus'. 'Now in this inscription we find the word *patritius* spelt with a *t*. We find also the two forms *tribunicia* and *tribunitia* once or twice over. It is plain that to the ear of Augustus either form sounded alike, and he therefore wrote them indifferently. And so, if I may rely on the transcript given by Egger (*Historiens d'Auguste*), it would seem to be absolutely demonstrated that in the best classical age *ci* = *ti* pure...and their common sound, as I have already said, can only have been a sibilant, such as *s* or *sh* or *ch*'. But the transcript may not be relied on: let Egger be a warning not to pin one's faith on the Reinesii, Apiani and Gruters of old. For the last six years I have treasured, as one of the most precious works for the study of Latin orthography, Mommsen's elaborate monograph on the 'Res gestae divi Augusti'. Every conceivable pains has been taken to ensure the minutest accuracy, every letter has been studiously pored over. We find then *patriciorum* once, *tribunicius* thrice: I need not say the *t* never occurs. Augustus cashiered an officer who wrote *isse* for *ipse*. What would he have done to one who spelt *patritius* or *tribunitius*? At the very least he

would have sent him to keep poor Ovid company. If Dr Merivale will prove, or even make it probable to me, that Divus Augustus once in his life wrote or spoke *patritius* or *tribunit. pot.*, I will renounce for ever Latin orthography and pronunciation; I will cry *peccavi*, not *peccawi*; I will promise to say *Marsh*, *Marshus*, *Marshius*, and— But no, I cannot pledge myself to *porsha* and *exanshlare*.

TRINITY COLLEGE : *September 1871.*



